Letter 73

[1] Those who suppose that men faithfully devoted to philosophy are defiant and unruly, scorners of magistrates or kings or of those through whom public affairs are administered, seem to me to be mistaken. On the contrary, no one is more grateful toward such rulers than the philosophers are, and with good reason; for to no one do rulers grant more than to those who are permitted to enjoy untroubled leisure. [2] Therefore those for whom public security contributes much toward their purpose of living well must necessarily revere the author of this good as a father, indeed far more than do those restless men, placed in the public eye, who owe much to princes but also charge much to their account, men for whom no liberality can ever provide so fully as to satisfy their desires, which grow as they are filled. But whoever is thinking about what he is to receive has forgotten what he has received; and desire has no greater evil than this, that it is ungrateful. [3] Add to this the fact that no one engaged in public life looks at how many he surpasses, but at those by whom he is surpassed; and to such men it is not so pleasant to see many behind them as it is galling to see anyone ahead of them. Every kind of ambition has this fault: it does not look back. And not ambition alone is unstable, but every kind of desire, because it always begins at its own end. [4] But that man, sincere and pure, who has left both the senate house and the forum and all administration of the commonwealth in order to withdraw to greater things, loves those through whom he is permitted to do this in safety; he alone renders them unsolicited testimony and owes a great debt to men who do not know it. Just as he venerates and looks up to his teachers, by whose kindness he escapes from those trackless ways, so too he reveres those under whose protection he is placed and practices the noble arts. [5] "But the king protects others as well by his power." Who denies it? Yet just as, among those who have enjoyed the same calm sea, a man judges himself to owe more to Neptune if he has carried more goods and more precious ones across that sea, and the vow is paid more eagerly by the merchant than by the passenger, and among the merchants themselves the one who carried perfumes and purple cloth and goods to be weighed against gold reckons himself bound more lavishly than the one who had piled up the cheapest wares, things destined to serve as ballast, so too the benefit of this peace, though it pertains to all, reaches more deeply those who use it well. [6] For there are many among these toga-wearing citizens for whom peace is more burdensome than war: do you suppose that those who spend it on drunkenness or lust or other vices, vices that ought to be broken even by war, owe the same for peace? Unless perhaps you think the wise man so unjust as to judge that he, as an individual, owes nothing in return for the goods held in common. I owe a very great deal to the sun and the moon, and yet they do not rise for me alone; I am privately bound to the year and to the god who tempers the year, although nothing has been apportioned [...] in my honor. [7] The foolish greed of mortals draws a distinction between possession and ownership, and believes that nothing is its own which is public; but that wise man judges nothing more his own than that in which he holds partnership with the human race. For these things would not be common unless a part of them belonged to individuals; even what is common in the smallest portion makes one a sharer. [8] Add now that great and true goods are not divided in such a way that only a small share falls to each individual: they come whole to each one. From a public bounty men carry off only as much as has been promised per head; the feast and the meat-dole and whatever else is taken in hand are split into portions; but these indivisible goods, peace and liberty, belong whole to all just as much as to individuals. [9] And so the wise man considers through whom he obtains the use and enjoyment of these things, through whom public necessity does not summon him to arms, nor to keeping the watches, nor to guarding the walls and the manifold tribute of war, and he gives thanks to his helmsman. This above all is what philosophy teaches: to owe benefits well and to repay them well; but sometimes the repayment is the acknowledgment itself. [10] He will therefore confess that he owes much to the man by whose administration and foresight there falls to him a rich leisure, command of his own time, and a quiet undisturbed by public occupations. [11] If even that leisure too owes much to its author, the leisure whose greatest gift is this, how highly do we value this leisure that is spent among the gods, that makes us gods? [12] So I say, Lucilius, and I call you to heaven by a shortcut. Sextius used to say that Jupiter can do no more than a good man. Jupiter has more things that he can bestow upon men, but between two good men the wealthier is not the better, any more than, between two men with equal skill in handling the tiller, you would call the better the one who has the larger and more splendid ship. [13] In what does Jupiter surpass the good man? He is good for longer: the wise man esteems himself no less because his virtues are confined within a shorter span. Just as, of two wise men, the one who departed at a greater age is not happier than the one whose virtue was bounded within fewer years, so a god does not surpass the wise man in happiness, even if he surpasses him in age; virtue is not greater because it is longer. [14] Jupiter possesses all things, but he has of course handed them over to others to possess: to him alone pertains this single use, that he is the cause of all things' being used. The wise man looks upon and despises all that is in others' hands with as level a mind as Jupiter does, and esteems himself the more on this account, that Jupiter cannot use them, while the wise man does not wish to. [15] Let us therefore trust Sextius as he points out the most beautiful path and cries, "This way, this way along frugality, this way along self-restraint, this way along courage!" The gods are not disdainful, not envious: they admit us, and stretch out a hand to those who climb. [16] Do you marvel that man goes to the gods? God comes to men, indeed, what is nearer, he comes into men: no mind is good without God. Divine seeds are scattered throughout human bodies, and if a good cultivator receives them, they come forth resembling their origin and rise up equal to those from which they sprang; but if a bad one receives them, then, no differently than barren and marshy ground, he kills them and thereafter produces refuse instead of crops. Farewell.

It seems to me erroneous to believe that those who have loyally dedicated themselves to philosophy are stubborn and rebellious, scorners of magistrates or kings or of those who control the administration of public affairs. For, on the contrary, no class of man is so popular with the philosopher as the ruler is; and rightly so, because rulers bestow upon no men a greater privilege than upon those who are allowed to enjoy peace and leisure. Hence, those who are greatly profited, as regards their purpose of right living, by the security of the State, must needs cherish as a father the author of this good; much more so, at any rate, than those restless persons who are always in the public eye, who owe much to the ruler, but also expect much from him, and are never so generously loaded with favours that their cravings, which grow by being supplied, are thoroughly satisfied. And yet he whose thoughts are of benefits to come has forgotten the benefits received; and there is no greater evil in covetousness than its ingratitude. Besides, no man in public life thinks of the many whom he has outstripped; he thinks rather of those by whom he is outstripped. And these men find it less pleasing to see many behind them than annoying to see anyone ahead of them. That is the trouble with every sort of ambition; it does not look back. Nor is it ambition alone that is fickle, but also every sort of craving, because it always begins where it ought to end. But that other man, upright and pure, who has left the senate and the bar and all affairs of state, that he may retire to nobler affairs, cherishes those who have made it possible for him to do this in security; he is the only person who returns spontaneous thanks to them, the only person who owes them a great debt without their knowledge. Just as a man honours and reveres his teachers, by whose aid he has found release from his early wanderings, so the sage honours these men, also, under whose guardianship he can put his good theories into practice. But you answer: “Other men too are protected by a king’s personal power.” Perfectly true. But just as, out of a number of persons who have profited by the same stretch of calm weather, a man deems that his debt to Neptune is greater if his cargo during that voyage has been more extensive and valuable, and just as the vow is paid with more of a will by the merchant than by the passenger, and just as, from among the merchants themselves, heartier thanks are uttered by the dealer in spices, purple fabrics, and objects worth their weight in gold, than by him who has gathered cheap merchandise that will be nothing but ballast for his ship; similarly, the benefits of this peace, which extends to all, are more deeply appreciated by those who make good use of it. For there are many of our toga-clad citizens to whom peace brings more trouble than war. Or do those, think you, owe as much as we do for the peace they enjoy, who spend it in drunkenness, or in lust, or in other vices which it were worth even a war to interrupt? No, not unless you think that the wise man is so unfair as to believe that as an individual he owes nothing in return for the advantages which he enjoys with all the rest. I owe a great debt to the sun and to the moon; and yet they do not rise for me alone. I am personally beholden to the seasons and to the god who controls them, although in no respect have they been apportioned for my benefit. The foolish greed of mortals makes a distinction between possession and ownership, and believes that it has ownership in nothing in which the general public has a share. But our philosopher considers nothing more truly his own than that which he shares in partnership with all mankind. For these things would not be common property, as indeed they are, unless every individual had his quota; even a joint interest based upon the slightest share makes one a partner. Again, the great and true goods are not divided in such a manner that each has but a slight interest; they belong in their entirety to each individual. At a distribution of grain men receive only the amount that has been promised to each person; the banquet and the meat-dole, or all else that a man can carry away with him, are divided into parts. These goods, however, are indivisible,—I mean peace and liberty,—and they belong in their entirety to all men just as much as they belong to each individual. Therefore the philosopher thinks of the person who makes it possible for him to use and enjoy these things, of the person who exempts him when the state’s dire need summons to arms, to sentry duty, to the defence of the walls, and to the manifold exactions of war; and he gives thanks to the helmsman of his state. This is what philosophy teaches most of all,—honourably to avow the debt of benefits received, and honourably to pay them; sometimes, however, the acknowledgment itself constitutes payment. Our philosopher will therefore acknowledge that he owes a large debt to the ruler who makes it possible, by his management and foresight, for him to enjoy rich leisure, control of his own time, and a tranquillity uninterrupted by public employments. Shepherd! a god this leisure gave to me, For he shall be my god eternally. And if even such leisure as that of our poet owes a great debt to its author, though its greatest boon is this: As thou canst see, He let me turn my cattle out to feed, And play what fancy pleased on rustic reed; how highly are we to value this leisure of the philosopher, which is spent among the gods, and makes us gods? Yes, that is what I mean, Lucilius; and I invite you to heaven by a short cut. Sextius used to say that Jupiter had no more power than the good man. Of course, Jupiter has more gifts which he can offer to mankind; but when you are choosing between two good men, the richer is not necessarily the better, any more than, in the case of two pilots of equal skill in managing the tiller, you would call him the better whose ship is larger and more imposing. In what respect is Jupiter superior to our good man? His goodness lasts longer; but the wise man does not set a lower value upon himself, just because his virtues are limited by a briefer span. Or take two wise men; he who has died at a greater age is not happier than he whose virtue has been limited to fewer years: similarly, a god has no advantage over a wise man in point of happiness, even though he has such an advantage in point of years. That virtue is not greater which lasts longer. Jupiter possesses all things, but he has surely given over the possession of them to others; the only use of them which belongs to him is this: he is the cause of their use to all men. The wise man surveys and scorns all the possessions of others as calmly as does Jupiter, and regards himself with the greater esteem because, while Jupiter cannot make use of them, he, the wise man, does not wish to do so. Let us therefore believe Sextius when he shows us the path of perfect beauty, and cries: “This is ‘the way to the stars’; this is the way, by observing thrift, self-restraint, and courage!” The gods are not disdainful or envious; they open the door to you; they lend a hand as you climb. Do you marvel that man goes to the gods? God comes to men; nay, he comes nearer,—he comes into men. No mind that has not God, is good. Divine seeds are scattered throughout our mortal bodies; if a good husbandman receives them, they spring up in the likeness of their source and of a parity with those from which they came. If, however, the husbandman be bad, like a barren or marshy soil, he kills the seeds, and causes tares to grow up instead of wheat. Farewell.

[1] Errare mihi videntur qui existimant philosophiae fideliter deditos contumaces esse ac refractarios, contemptores magistratuum aut regum eorumve per quos publica administrantur. Ex contrario enim nulli adversus illos gratiores sunt, nec immerito; nullis enim plus praestant quam quibus frui tranquillo otio licet. [2] Itaque ii quibus multum ad propositum bene vivendi confert securitas publica necesse est auctorem huius boni ut parentem colant, multo quidem magis quam illi inquieti et in medio positi, qui multa principibus debent sed multa et imputant, quibus numquam tam plene occurrere ulla liberalitas potest ut cupiditates illorum, quae crescunt dum implentur, exsatiet. Quisquis autem de accipiendo cogitat oblitus accepti est, nec ullum habet malum cupiditas maius quam quod ingrata est. [3] Adice nunc quod nemo eorum qui in re publica versantur quot vincat, sed a quibus vincatur, aspicit; et illis non tam iucundum est multos post se videre quam grave aliquem ante se. Habet hoc vitium omnis ambitio: non respicit. Nec ambitio tantum instabilis est, verum cupiditas omnis, quia incipit semper a fine. [4] At ille vir sincerus ac purus, qui reliquit et curiam et forum et omnem administrationem rei publicae ut ad ampliora secederet, diligit eos per quos hoc ei facere tuto licet solusque illis gratuitum testimonium reddit et magnam rem nescientibus debet. Quemadmodum praeceptores suos veneratur ac suspicit quorum beneficio illis inviis exit, sic et hos sub quorum tutela positus exercet artes bonas. [5] 'Verum alios quoque rex viribus suis protegit.' Quis negat? Sed quemadmodum Neptuno plus debere se iudicat ex iis qui eadem tranquillitate usi sunt qui plura et pretiosiora illo mari vexit, animosius a mercatore quam a vectore solvitur votum et ex ipsis mercatoribus effusius ratus est qui odores ac purpuras et auro pensanda portabat quam qui vilissima quaeque et saburrae loco futura congesserat, sic huius pacis beneficium ad omnis pertinentis altius ad eos pervenit qui illa bene utuntur. [6] Multi enim sunt ex his togatis quibus pax operosior bello est: an idem existimas pro pace debere eos qui illam ebrietati aut libidini impendunt aut aliis vitiis quae vel bello rumpenda sunt? Nisi forte tam iniquum putas esse sapientem ut nihil viritim se debere pro communibus bonis iudicet. Soli lunaeque plurimum debeo, et non uni mihi oriuntur; anno temperantique annum deo privatim obligatus sum, quamvis nihil in meum honorem *** discripta sint. [7] Stulta avaritia mortalium possessionem proprietatemque discernit nec quicquam suum credit esse quod publicum est; at ille sapiens nihil magis suum iudicat quam cuius illi cum humano genere consortium est. Nec enim essent ista communia, nisi pars illorum pertineret ad singulos; socium efficit etiam quod ex minima portione commune est. [8] Adice nunc quod magna et vera bona non sic dividuntur ut exiguum in singulos cadat: ad unumquemque tota perveniunt. E congiario tantum ferunt homines quantum in capita promissum est; epulum et visceratio et quidquid aliud manu capitur discedit in partes: at haec individua bona, pax et libertas, ea tam omnium tota quam singulorum sunt. [9] Cogitat itaque per quem sibi horum usus fructusque contingat, per quem non ad arma illum nec ad servandas vigilias nec ad tuenda moenia et multiplex belli tributum publica necessitas vocet, agitque gubernatori suo gratias. Hoc docet philosophia praecipue, bene debere beneficia, bene solvere; interdum autem solutio est ipsa confessio. [10] Confitebitur ergo multum se debere ei cuius administratione ac providentia contingit illi pingue otium et arbitrium sui temporis et imperturbata publicis occupationibus quies. [11] Si illa quoque otia multum auctori suo debent quorum munus hoc maximum est, quanti aestimamus hoc otium quod inter deos agitur, quod deos facit? [12] Ita dico, Lucili, et te in caelum compendiario voco. Solebat Sextius dicere Iovem plus non posse quam bonum virum. Plura Iuppiter habet quae praestet hominibus, sed inter duos bonos non est melior qui locupletior, non magis quam inter duos quibus par scientia regendi gubernaculum est meliorem dixeris cui maius speciosiusque navigium est. [13] Iuppiter quo antecedit virum bonum? diutius bonus est: sapiens nihilo se minoris aestimat quod virtutes eius spatio breviore cluduntur. Quemadmodum ex duobus sapientibus qui senior decessit non est beatior eo cuius intra pauciores annos terminata virtus est, sic deus non vincit sapientem felicitate, etiam si vincit aetate; non est virtus maior quae longior. [14] Iuppiter omnia habet, sed nempe aliis tradidit habenda: ad ipsum hic unus usus pertinet, quod utendi omnibus causa est: sapiens tam aequo animo omnia apud alios videt contemnitque quam Iuppiter et hoc se magis suspicit quod Iuppiter uti illis non potest, sapiens non vult. [15] Credamus itaque Sextio monstranti pulcherrimum iter et clamanti 'hac hac secundum frugalitatem, hac secundum temperantiam, hac secundum fortitudinem'. Non sunt dii fastidiosi, non invidi: admittunt et ascendentibus manum porrigunt. [16] Miraris hominem ad deos ire? Deus ad homines venit, immo quod est propius, in homines venit: nulla sine deo mens bona est. Semina in corporibus humanis divina dispersa sunt, quae si bonus cultor excipit, similia origini prodeunt et paria iis ex quibus orta sunt surgunt: si malus, non aliter quam humus sterilis ac palustris necat ac deinde creat purgamenta pro frugibus. Vale.