Letter 65

[1] I divided yesterday with poor health: it claimed the morning for itself, and ceded the afternoon to me. So I first tested my mind with reading; then, once it had taken that in, I dared to demand more of it, or rather to grant it more. I wrote something, and indeed with more concentration than I usually do, while I wrestle with a difficult subject and refuse to be beaten, until some friends intervened to use force on me and to restrain me as one restrains a sick man who has no self-control. [2] Conversation took the place of the pen, and from it I will report to you the part that is still in dispute. We have appointed you arbiter. You have more business on your hands than you suppose: the case has three sides. Our Stoics, as you know, say that there are two things in the nature of things from which all things come to be: cause and matter. Matter lies inert, a substance ready for anything, but destined to stay idle if no one sets it in motion; cause, on the other hand, that is, reason, gives matter its form and turns it in whatever direction it wishes, and out of it produces varied works. There must, then, be that out of which something is made, and next that by which it is made: the latter is the cause, the former the matter. [3] Every art is an imitation of nature; so transfer what I was saying about the universe to these things that are to be made by man. A statue both had matter that would submit to the craftsman, and a craftsman who would give the matter a shape; so in the statue the matter was bronze, the cause was the workman. The same condition holds for all things: they consist of that which is made and of that which makes. [4] The Stoics hold that there is one cause, namely that which makes. Aristotle thinks that 'cause' is spoken of in three ways. 'The first cause,' he says, 'is matter itself, without which nothing can be brought about; the second is the workman; the third is the form, which is imposed upon each work, as upon a statue.' For this Aristotle calls the eidos. 'A fourth too,' he says, 'is added to these: the purpose of the whole work.' [5] Let me make clear what this is. Bronze is the first cause of the statue, for it would never have been made unless there had been that out of which it could be cast or hammered. The second cause is the artist, for that bronze could not have been shaped into the form of a statue unless skilled hands had been brought to it. The third cause is the form, for that statue would not be called the Doryphoros [the Spear-bearer, a famous statue by Polyclitus] or the Diadumenos [the Athlete Binding his Hair] unless this particular appearance had been stamped upon it. The fourth cause is the purpose of making it, for unless this had existed, it would not have been made. [6] What is the purpose? That which prompted the artist, which he pursued in making it: it is either money, if he made it to sell, or glory, if he labored for a name, or religion, if he prepared it as a gift for a temple. So this too is a cause on account of which it is made: or do you not think that, among the causes of a work that has been made, we should count that which, once removed, would have left the work unmade? [7] To these Plato adds a fifth, the model, which he himself calls the 'idea'; for this is what the artist looks to in carrying out what he intended. Now it makes no difference to the matter whether he has the model outside himself, to which he can turn his eyes, or within, where he himself has conceived and set it. God has within himself these models of all things, and his mind has comprehended the numbers and the measures of the whole of what is to be done; he is full of those shapes which Plato calls 'ideas,' immortal, unchangeable, untiring. And so, while men perish, humanity itself, on which man is patterned, endures, and though men toil and pass away, it suffers nothing. [8] There are, then, five causes, as Plato says: that out of which, that by which, that in which, that toward which, that on account of which; and last of all, that which results from these. As in the case of a statue, since we have begun to speak of this: that out of which is the bronze, that by which is the artist, that in which is the form that is fitted to it, that toward which is the model that the maker imitates, that on account of which is the maker's purpose, and that which results from these is the statue itself. [9] The world too has all these, as Plato says: a maker, this is God; that out of which it is made, this is matter; a form, this is the configuration and order of the world that we see; a model, namely that toward which God made this vast and most beautiful work; a purpose, on account of which he made it. [10] You ask what God's purpose is? Goodness. So at any rate Plato says: 'What was God's reason for making the world? He is good; and one who is good begrudges no good to anyone; so he made it as good as he could.' Give your verdict, then, judge, and declare who seems to you to speak most plausibly, not who speaks most truly; for that is as far above us as truth itself. [11] This crowd of causes set out by Aristotle and Plato takes in either too many or too few. For if they judge that anything, the removal of which makes a thing impossible to produce, is a cause of the making, they have named too few. Let them put time among the causes: nothing can come to be without time. Let them put place: if there is no place where something can come to be, it will not come to be at all. Let them put motion: nothing either comes to be or perishes without it; without motion there is no art, no change. [12] But we are now seeking the first and general cause. This must be simple, for matter too is simple. We are asking what the cause is? Plainly the reason that makes, that is, God; for those things you all listed are not many separate causes, but depend on one, on that which makes. [13] You say form is a cause? The artist imposes this on the work: it is part of the cause, not the cause. The model too is not a cause, but a necessary instrument of the cause. The model is as necessary to the artist as the chisel or the file: without these art cannot proceed, yet these are not parts of the art or causes of it. [14] 'The artist's purpose,' he says, 'on account of which he sets about making something, is a cause.' Granted it is a cause, it is not the efficient cause, but an accessory one. And these are countless: we are asking about the general cause. But what they said was not up to their usual subtlety, namely that the whole world and the finished work is a cause; for there is a great difference between a work and the cause of the work. [15] Either give your verdict or, what is easier in matters of this kind, declare that it is not clear to you and bid us return to it. You say: 'What pleases you about wasting your time on these matters, which strip you of no emotion, drive off no desire?' For my part I deal with and handle those things by which the mind is brought to peace, and I examine myself first, then this world. [16] Not even now do I waste my time, as you suppose; for all these subjects, if they are not minced and torn apart into this useless subtlety, lift up and lighten the mind, which, pressed by a heavy burden, longs to be unfolded and to return to the things it once belonged to. For this body is a weight and a punishment on the mind; while it presses, the mind is hard pressed, it is in chains, unless philosophy has come to it and bidden it breathe again through the spectacle of the natural world and has released it from earthly things to divine ones. This is its liberty, this its roaming abroad; for a while it withdraws itself from the custody in which it is held and is restored by the sky. [17] Just as craftsmen, when some finer piece of work that tires the eyes with concentration has been keeping them busy, if they have a poor and grudging light, go out into the open and in some district set aside for the people's leisure delight their eyes in the free light, so the mind, shut up in this gloomy and dark dwelling, whenever it can, seeks the open and finds rest in the contemplation of the natural world. [18] The wise man, and the follower of wisdom, does indeed cling to his body, but with his best part he is absent, and he directs his thoughts toward sublime things. As though bound by a soldier's oath, he counts this span that he lives as a term of service; and he is so fashioned that he has for life neither love nor hatred, and he endures mortal things although he knows that greater things remain. [19] Do you forbid me the examination of the natural world, and, drawing me away from the whole, confine me to a part? Shall I not ask what the first principles of all things are? who shaped them? who separated all things that were sunk in one mass and wrapped up in inert matter? Shall I not ask who is the artist of this world? by what reason so great a magnitude came under law and order? who gathered the scattered things, distinguished the confused ones, parted out an appearance to things lying in a single formlessness? from where so great a light is poured forth? whether it is fire, or something brighter than fire? [20] Shall I not ask these things? Shall I not know from where I have come down? whether I am to see these things once, or whether I must be born many times? where I shall go from here? what abode awaits the soul once it is released from the laws of human servitude? Do you forbid me to take part in the heavens, that is, do you order me to live with my head bowed down? [21] I am greater, and born for greater things, than to be the slave of my body, which I regard as nothing other than a chain thrown around my freedom; so I set it against fortune as a barrier in which her blow may stop, and I let no wound pass through it to me. Whatever in me can suffer injury, this is it: within this vulnerable dwelling the soul lives free. [22] Never shall this flesh compel me to fear, never to any pretense unworthy of a good man; never shall I lie to do honor to this little body. When it seems right, I will dissolve my partnership with it; and even now, while we cling together, we will not be partners on equal terms: the soul shall claim every right for itself. Contempt for one's own body is sure freedom. [23] To return to my subject, much will be contributed to this freedom by that examination of which we were just speaking; for the universe consists of matter and of God. God governs these things which, poured around him, follow him as their ruler and guide. But that which makes, which is God, is more powerful and more precious than the matter that submits to God. [24] The place that God holds in this world, the soul holds in man; what matter is there, the body is in us. Let the worse, then, serve the better; let us be brave against the blows of chance; let us not tremble at injuries, nor wounds, nor chains, nor want. What is death? Either an end or a passage. I do not fear ceasing to be, for that is the same as not having begun, nor do I fear passing over, because nowhere shall I be so cramped. Farewell.

I shared my time yesterday with ill health; it claimed for itself all the period before noon; in the afternoon, however, it yielded to me. And so I first tested my spirit by reading; then, when reading was found to be possible, I dared to make more demands upon the spirit, or perhaps I should say, to make more concessions to it. I wrote a little, and indeed with more concentration than usual, for I am struggling with a difficult subject and do not wish to be downed. In the midst of this, some friends visited me, with the purpose of employing force and of restraining me, as if I were a sick man indulging in some excess. So conversation was substituted for writing; and from this conversation I shall communicate to you the topic which is still the subject of debate; for we have appointed you referee. You have more of a task on your hands than you suppose, for the argument is threefold. Our Stoic philosophers, as you know, declare that there are two things in the universe which are the source of everything,—namely, cause and matter. Matter lies sluggish, a substance ready for any use, but sure to remain unemployed if no one sets it in motion. Cause, however, by which we mean reason, moulds matter and turns it in whatever direction it will, producing thereby various concrete results. Accordingly, there must be, in the case of each thing, that from which it is made, and, next, an agent by which it is made. The former is its material, the latter its cause. All art is but imitation of nature; therefore, let me apply these statements of general principles to the things which have to be made by man. A statue, for example, has afforded matter which was to undergo treatment at the hands of the artist, and has had an artist who was to give form to the matter. Hence, in the case of the statue, the material was bronze, the cause was the workman. And so it goes with all things,—they consist of that which is made, and of the maker. The Stoics believe in one cause only,—the maker; but Aristotle thinks that the word “cause” can be used in three ways: “The first cause,” he says, “is the actual matter, without which nothing can be created. The second is the workman. The third is the form, which is impressed upon every work,—a statue, for example.” This last is what Aristotle calls the idos. “There is, too,” says he, “a fourth,—the purpose of the work as a whole.” Now I shall show you what this last means. Bronze is the “first cause” of the statue, for it could never have been made unless there had been something from which it could be cast and moulded. The “second cause” is the artist; for without the skilled hands of a workman that bronze could not have been shaped to the outlines of the statue. The “third cause” is the form, inasmuch as our statue could never be called The Lance-Bearer or The Boy Binding his Hair, had not this special shape been stamped upon it. The “fourth cause” is the purpose of the work. For if this purpose had not existed, the statue would not have been made. Now what is this purpose? It is that which attracted the artist, which he followed when he made the statue. It may have been money, if he has made it for sale; or renown, if he has worked for reputation; or religion, if he has wrought it as a gift for a temple. Therefore this also is a cause contributing towards the making of the statue; or do you think that we should avoid including, among the causes of a thing which has been made, that element without which the thing in question would not have been made? To these four Plato adds a fifth cause,—the pattern which he himself calls the “idea"; for it is this that the artist gazed upon when he created the work which he had decided to carry out. Now it makes no difference whether he has his pattern outside himself, that he may direct his glance to it, or within himself, conceived and placed there by himself. God has within himself these patterns of all things, and his mind comprehends the harmonies and the measures of the whole totality of things which are to be carried out; he is filled with these shapes which Plato calls the “ideas,”—imperishable, unchangeable, not subject to decay. And therefore, though men die, humanity itself, or the idea of man, according to which man is moulded, lasts on, and though men toil and perish, it suffers no change. Accordingly, there are five causes, as Plato says: the material, the agent, the make-up, the model, and the end in view. Last comes the result of all these. Just as in the case of the statue,—to go back to the figure with which we began,—the material is the bronze, the agent is the artist, the make-up is the form which is adapted to the material, the model is the pattern imitated by the agent, the end in view is the purpose in the maker’s mind, and, finally, the result of all these is the statue itself. The universe also, in Plato’s opinion, possesses all these elements. The agent is God; the source, matter; the form, the shape and the arrangement of the visible world. The pattern is doubtless the model according to which God has made this great and most beautiful creation. The purpose is his object in so doing. Do you ask what God’s purpose is? It is goodness. Plato, at any rate, says: “What was God’s reason for creating the world? God is good, and no good person is grudging of anything that is good. Therefore, God made it the best world possible.” Hand down your opinion, then, O judge; state who seems to you to say what is truest, and not who says what is absolutely true. For to do that is as far beyond our ken as truth itself. This throng of causes, defined by Aristotle and by Plato, embraces either too much or too little. For if they regard as “causes” of an object that is to be made everything without which the object cannot be made, they have named too few. Time must be included among the causes; for nothing can be made without time. They must also include place; for if there be no place where a thing can be made, it will not be made. And motion too; nothing is either made or destroyed without motion. There is no art without motion, no change of any kind. Now, however, I am searching for the first, the general cause; this must be simple, inasmuch as matter, too, is simple. Do we ask what cause is? It is surely Creative Reason,—in other words, God. For those elements to which you referred are not a great series of independent causes; they all hinge on one alone, and that will be the creative cause. Do you maintain that form is a cause? This is only what the artist stamps upon his work; it is part of a cause, but not the cause. Neither is the pattern a cause, but an indispensable tool of the cause. His pattern is as indispensable to the artist as the chisel or the file; without these, art can make no progress. But for all that, these things are neither parts of the art, nor causes of it. “Then,” perhaps you will say, “the purpose of the artist, that which leads him to undertake to create something, is the cause.” It may be a cause; it is not, however, the efficient cause, but only an accessory cause. But there are countless accessory causes; what we are discussing is the general cause. Now the statement of Plato and Aristotle is not in accord with their usual penetration, when they maintain that the whole universe, the perfectly wrought work, is a cause. For there is a great difference between a work and the cause of a work. Either give your opinion, or, as is easier in cases of this kind, declare that the matter is not clear and call for another hearing. But you will reply: “What pleasure do you get from wasting your time on these problems, which relieve you of none of your emotions, rout none of your desires?” So far as I am concerned, I treat and discuss them as matters which contribute greatly toward calming the spirit, and I search myself first, and then the world about me. And not even now am I, as you think, wasting my time. For all these questions, provided that they be not chopped up and torn apart into such unprofitable refinements, elevate and lighten the soul, which is weighted down by a heavy burden and desires to be freed and to return to the elements of which it was once a part. For this body of ours is a weight upon the soul and its penance; as the load presses down the soul is crushed and is in bondage, unless philosophy has come to its assistance and has bid it take fresh courage by contemplating the universe, and has turned it from things earthly to things divine. There it has its liberty, there it can roam abroad; meantime it escapes the custody in which it is bound, and renews its life in heaven. Just as skilled workmen, who have been engaged upon some delicate piece of work which wearies their eyes with straining, if the light which they have is niggardly or uncertain, go forth into the open air and in some park devoted to the people’s recreation delight their eyes in the generous light of day; so the soul, imprisoned as it has been in this gloomy and darkened house, seeks the open sky whenever it can, and in the contemplation of the universe finds rest. The wise man, the seeker after wisdom, is bound closely, indeed, to his body, but he is an absentee so far as his better self is concerned, and he concentrates his thoughts upon lofty things. Bound, so to speak, to his oath of allegiance, he regards the period of life as his term of service. He is so trained that he neither loves nor hates life; he endures a mortal lot, although he knows that an ampler lot is in store for him. Do you forbid me to contemplate the universe? Do you compel me to withdraw from the whole and restrict me to a part? May I not ask what are the beginnings of all things, who moulded the universe, who took the confused and conglomerate mass of sluggish matter, and separated it into its parts? May I not inquire who is the Master-Builder of this universe, how the mighty bulk was brought under the control of law and order, who gathered together the scattered atoms, who separated the disordered elements and assigned an outward form to elements that lay in one vast shapelessness? Or whence came all the expanse of light? And whether is it fire, or something even brighter than fire? Am I not to ask these questions? Must I be ignorant of the heights whence I have descended? Whether I am to see this world but once, or to be born many times? What is my destination afterwards? What abode awaits my soul on its release from the laws of slavery among men? Do you forbid me to have a share in heaven? In other words, do you bid me live with my head bowed down? No, I am above such an existence; I was born to a greater destiny than to be a mere chattel of my body, and I regard this body as nothing but a chain which manacles my freedom. Therefore, I offer it as a sort of buffer to fortune, and shall allow no wound to penetrate through to my soul. For my body is the only part of me which can suffer injury. In this dwelling, which is exposed to peril, my soul lives free. Never shall this flesh drive me to feel fear, or to assume any pretence that is unworthy of a good man. Never shall I lie in order to honour this petty body. When it seems proper, I shall sever my connexion with it. And at present, while we are bound together, our alliance shall nevertheless not be one of equality; the soul shall bring all quarrels before its own tribunal. To despise our bodies is sure freedom. To return to our subject; this freedom will be greatly helped by the contemplation of which we were just speaking. All things are made up of matter and of God; God controls matter, which encompasses him and follows him as its guide and leader. And that which creates, in other words, God, is more powerful and precious than matter, which is acted upon by God. God’s place in the universe corresponds to the soul’s relation to man. World-matter corresponds to our mortal body; therefore let the lower serve the higher. Let us be brave in the face of hazards. Let us not fear wrongs, or wounds, or bonds, or poverty. And what is death? It is either the end, or a process of change. I have no fear of ceasing to exist; it is the same as not having begun. Nor do I shrink from changing into another state, because I shall, under no conditions, be as cramped as I am now. Farewell.

[1] Hesternum diem divisi cum mala valetudine: antemeridianum illa sibi vindicavit, postmeridiano mihi cessit. Itaque lectione primum temptavi animum; deinde, cum hanc recepisset, plus illi imperare ausus sum, immo permittere: aliquid scripsi et quidem intentius quam soleo, dum cum materia difficili contendo et vinci nolo, donec intervenerunt amici qui mihi vim afferrent et tamquam aegrum intemperantem coercerent. [2] In locum stili sermo successit, ex quo eam partem ad te perferam quae in lite est. Te arbitrum addiximus. Plus negotii habes quam existimas: triplex causa est. Dicunt, ut scis, Stoici nostri duo esse in rerum natura ex quibus omnia fiant, causam et materiam. Materia iacet iners, res ad omnia parata, cessatura si nemo moveat; causa autem, id est ratio, materiam format et quocumque vult versat, ex illa varia opera producit. Esse ergo debet unde fiat aliquid, deinde a quo fiat: hoc causa est, illud materia. [3] Omnis ars naturae imitatio est; itaque quod de universo dicebam ad haec transfer quae ab homine facienda sunt. Statua et materiam habuit quae pateretur artificem, et artificem qui materiae daret faciem; ergo in statua materia aes fuit, causa opifex. Eadem condicio rerum omnium est: ex eo constant quod fit, et ex eo quod facit. [4] Stoicis placet unam causam esse, id quod facit. Aristoteles putat causam tribus modis dici: 'prima' inquit 'causa est ipsa materia, sine qua nihil potest effici; secunda opifex; tertia est forma, quae unicuique operi imponitur tamquam statuae'. Nam hanc Aristoteles 'idos' vocat. 'Quarta quoque' inquit 'his accedit, propositum totius operis.' [5] Quid sit hoc aperiam. Aes prima statuae causa est; numquam enim facta esset, nisi fuisset id ex quo funderetur ducereturve. Secunda causa artifex est; non potuisset enim aes illud in habitum statuae figurari, nisi accessissent peritae manus. Tertia causa est forma; neque enim statua ista 'doryphoros' aut 'diadumenos' vocaretur, nisi haec illi esset impressa facies. Quarta causa est faciendi propositum; nam nisi hoc fuisset, facta non esset. [6] Quid est propositum? quod invitavit artificem, quod ille secutus fecit: vel pecunia est haec, si venditurus fabricavit, vel gloria, si laboravit in nomen, vel religio, si donum templo paravit. Ergo et haec causa est propter quam fit: an non putas inter causas facti operis esse numerandum quo remoto factum non esset? [7] His quintam Plato adicit exemplar, quam ipse 'idean' vocat; hoc est enim ad quod respiciens artifex id quod destinabat effecit. Nihil autem ad rem pertinet utrum foris habeat exemplar ad quod referat oculos an intus, quod ibi ipse concepit et posuit. Haec exemplaria rerum omnium deus intra se habet numerosque universorum quae agenda sunt et modos mente complexus est; plenus his figuris est quas Plato 'ideas' appellat, immortales, immutabiles, infatigabiles. Itaque homines quidem pereunt, ipsa autem humanitas, ad quam homo effingitur, permanet, et hominibus laborantibus, intereuntibus, illa nihil patitur. [8] Quinque ergo causae sunt, ut Plato dicit: id ex quo, id a quo, id in quo, id ad quod, id propter quod; novissime id quod ex his est. Tamquam in statua - quia de hac loqui coepimus - id ex quo aes est, id a quo artifex est, id in quo forma est quae aptatur illi, id ad quod exemplar est quod imitatur is qui facit, id propter quod facientis propositum est, id quod ex istis est ipsa statua <est>. [9] Haec omnia mundus quoque, ut ait Plato, habet: facientem, hic deus est; ex quo fit, haec materia est; formam, haec est habitus et ordo mundi quem videmus; exemplar, scilicet ad quod deus hanc magnitudinem operis pulcherrimi fecit; propositum, propter quod fecit. [10] Quaeris quod sit propositum deo? bonitas. Ita certe Plato ait: 'quae deo faciendi mundum fuit causa? bonus est; bono nulla cuiusquam boni invidia est; fecit itaque quam optimum potuit'. Fer ergo iudex sententiam et pronuntia quis tibi videatur verisimillimum dicere, non quis verissimum dicat; id enim tam supra nos est quam ipsa veritas. [11] Haec quae ab Aristotele et Platone ponitur turba causarum aut nimium multa aut nimium pauca comprendit. Nam si quocumque remoto quid effici non potest, id causam iudicant esse faciendi, pauca dixerunt. Ponant inter causas tempus: nihil sine tempore potest fieri. Ponant locum: si non fuerit ubi fiat aliquid, ne fiet quidem. Ponant motum: nihil sine hoc nec fit nec perit; nulla sine motu ars, nulla mutatio est. [12] Sed nos nunc primam et generalem quaerimus causam. Haec simplex esse debet; nam et materia simplex est. Quaerimus quid sit causa? ratio scilicet faciens, id est deus; ista enim quaecumque rettulistis non sunt multae et singulae causae, sed ex una pendent, ex ea quae facit. [13] Formam dicis causam esse? hanc imponit artifex operi: pars causae est, non causa. Exemplar quoque non est causa, sed instrumentum causae necessarium. Sic necessarium est exemplar artifici quomodo scalprum, quomodo lima: sine his procedere ars non potest, non tamen hae partes artis aut causae sunt. [14] 'Propositum' inquit 'artificis, propter quod ad faciendum aliquid accedit, causa est.' Ut sit causa, non est efficiens causa, sed superveniens. Hae autem innumerabiles sunt: nos de causa generali quaerimus. Illud vero non pro solita ipsis subtilitate dixerunt, totum mundum et consummatum opus causam esse; multum enim interest inter opus et causam operis. [15] Aut fer sententiam aut, quod facilius in eiusmodi rebus est, nega tibi liquere et nos reverti iube. 'Quid te' inquis 'delectat tempus inter ista conterere, quae tibi nullum affectum eripiunt, nullam cupiditatem abigunt?' Ego quidem [peiora] illa ago ac tracto quibus pacatur animus, et me prius scrutor, deinde hunc mundum. [16] Ne nunc quidem tempus, ut existimas, perdo; ista enim omnia, si non concidantur nec in hanc subtilitatem inutilem distrahantur, attollunt et levant animum, qui gravi sarcina pressus explicari cupit et reverti ad illa quorum fuit. Nam corpus hoc animi pondus ac poena est; premente illo urguetur, in vinclis est, nisi accessit philosophia et illum respirare rerum naturae spectaculo iussit et a terrenis ad divina dimisit. Haec libertas eius est, haec evagatio; subducit interim se custodiae in qua tenetur et caelo reficitur. [17] Quemadmodum artifices [ex] alicuius rei subtilioris quae intentione oculos defetigat, si malignum habent et precarium lumen, in publicum prodeunt et in aliqua regione ad populi otium dedicata oculos libera luce delectant, sic animus in hoc tristi et obscuro domicilio clusus, quotiens potest, apertum petit et in rerum naturae contemplatione requiescit. [18] Sapiens assectatorque sapientiae adhaeret quidem in corpore suo, sed optima sui parte abest et cogitationes suas ad sublimia intendit. Velut sacramento rogatus hoc quod vivit stipendium putat; et ita formatus est ut illi nec amor vitae nec odium sit, patiturque mortalia quamvis sciat ampliora superesse. [19] Interdicis mihi inspectione rerum naturae, a toto abductum redigis in partem? Ego non quaeram quae sint initia universorum? quis rerum formator? quis omnia in uno mersa et materia inerti convoluta discreverit? Non quaeram quis sit istius artifex mundi? qua ratione tanta magnitudo in legem et ordinem venerit? quis sparsa collegerit, confusa distinxerit, in una deformitate iacentibus faciem diviserit? unde lux tanta fundatur? ignis sit, an aliquid igne lucidius? [20] Ego ista non quaeram? ego nesciam unde descenderim? semel haec mihi videnda sint, an saepe nascendum? quo hinc iturus sim? quae sedes exspectet animam solutam legibus servitutis humanae? Vetas me caelo interesse, id est iubes me vivere capite demisso? [21] Maior sum et ad maiora genitus quam ut mancipium sim mei corporis, quod equidem non aliter aspicio quam vinclum aliquod libertati meae circumdatum; hoc itaque oppono fortunae, in quo resistat, nec per illud ad me ullum transire vulnus sino. Quidquid in me potest iniuriam pati hoc est in hoc obnoxio domicilio animus liber habitat. [22] Numquam me caro ista compellet ad metum, numquam ad indignam bono simulationem; numquam in honorem huius corpusculi mentiar. Cum visum erit, distraham cum illo societatem; et nunc tamen, dum haeremus, non erimus aequis partibus socii: animus ad se omne ius ducet. Contemptus corporis sui certa libertas est. [23] Ut ad propositum revertar, huic libertati multum conferet et illa de qua modo loquebamur inspectio; nempe universa ex materia et ex deo constant. Deus ista temperat quae circumfusa rectorem sequuntur et ducem. Potentius autem est ac pretiosius quod facit, quod est deus, quam materia patiens dei. [24] Quem in hoc mundo locum deus obtinet, hunc in homine animus; quod est illic materia, id in nobis corpus est. Serviant ergo deteriora melioribus; fortes simus adversus fortuita; non contremescamus iniurias, non vulnera, non vincula, non egestatem. Mors quid est? aut finis aut transitus. Nec desinere timeo - idem est enim quod non coepisse -, nec transire, quia nusquam tam anguste ero. Vale.