Letter 48

[1] To the letter you sent me from your journey, as long as the journey itself was, I will write back later; I need to withdraw and look carefully into what I should advise. For you too, who are asking my counsel, thought a long time about whether to ask it: how much more must I do this, when more delay is needed to settle a question than to pose it? And especially when one thing is to your advantage and another to mine. [2] Am I speaking once again like an Epicurean? In truth, the same thing is to my advantage as to yours: I am no friend at all unless whatever concerns you is also my own affair. Friendship makes a partnership of all things between us; nothing favorable or adverse belongs to one of us alone; we live in common. And no one can pass his life happily who looks only to himself, who turns everything to his own uses: you must live for another, if you wish to live for yourself. [3] This fellowship, observed with care and reverence, which mingles us as human beings with our fellow human beings and judges that there is some common law of the human race, contributes very much also to the cultivation of that more intimate fellowship of friendship of which I was speaking; for the man who shares much with a fellow human being will share everything with a friend. [4] On this point, Lucilius, best of men, I would rather have those subtle fellows instruct me about what I owe to a friend and what to a fellow human being, than about how many ways the word "friend" is used and how many things the word "human being" signifies. Look: wisdom and folly part company in opposite directions! Which do I side with? Which way do you bid me go? For the one, a human being counts as a friend; for the other, a friend does not count as a human being; the one acquires a friend for himself, the other makes himself for his friend. As for you, you twist words for me and sort out syllables. [5] Clearly, unless I construct the most cunning questions and, by a false conclusion, fasten on a lie born from the truth, I shall not be able to separate what is to be sought from what is to be avoided! I am ashamed: in so serious a matter, old men as we are, we are playing games. [Farewell. Seneca to his friend Lucilius, greetings.] [6] "'Mouse' is a syllable; but a mouse gnaws cheese; therefore a syllable gnaws cheese." Suppose now that I cannot untie this knot: what danger threatens me from such ignorance? What harm? No doubt I must take care that I do not someday catch syllables in a mousetrap, or that, if I grow rather careless, a book may eat up my cheese! Unless perhaps this collection is sharper still: "'Mouse' is a syllable; but a syllable does not gnaw cheese; therefore a mouse does not gnaw cheese." [7] What childish trifles! Is it for this that we have raised our eyebrows? For this that we have let our beards grow long? Is this what we teach, grim and pale? Do you want to know what philosophy promises to the human race? Counsel. Death summons one man, poverty scorches another, riches torment a third, whether another's or his own; this man dreads ill fortune, that one longs to slip away from his own good fortune; this man is ill-treated by other men, that one by the gods. Why do you compose these little games for me? This is no place for joking: you have been called in as an advocate for the wretched. You promised that you would bring help to the shipwrecked, the captive, the sick, the destitute, to those laying their heads beneath the poised axe: where are you turning aside? What are you doing? [This man with whom you are playing is afraid: come to his aid, [...]] All on every side stretch out their hands to you, imploring some help for lives ruined and about to perish; in you lie their hope and their resources; they beg you to drag them out of so great a turmoil, to show to them, scattered and wandering, the bright light of truth. [9] Tell them what nature has made necessary, what superfluous; what easy [laws] she has laid down, how pleasant life is, how unencumbered for those who follow them, how bitter and tangled it is for those who have trusted opinion more than nature *** if you first teach them which part of these burdens it will lighten. Which of their desires does it remove? Which does it restrain? Would that these things were merely of no profit! They do harm. Whenever you wish, I will make this perfectly plain to you: that a noble disposition, thrown into these quibbles, is crippled and weakened. [10] I am ashamed to say what weapons they hand to men about to march against fortune, and how they equip them. Is this the way one travels to the highest good? Through that "or not" of philosophy, and through exceptions shameful and disgraceful even for those who sit at the praetor's white board [the album, where legal notices were posted in the forum]? For what else are you doing, when you knowingly lead the man you are questioning into a trap, than making it appear that he has lost his case on a technicality? But just as the praetor restores such men to their original standing, so does philosophy restore these. [11] Why do you depart from your enormous promises and, after speaking grandly that you would bring it about that the gleam of gold should no more dazzle my eyes than the gleam of a sword, that with mighty steadfastness I should trample on both what all men long for and what all men fear, why do you descend to the rudiments of the grammarians? What are you saying? For this is what philosophy promises me: that it will make me equal to a god; to this I was invited, for this I came: make good your pledge. [12] As much as you can, then, my Lucilius, draw yourself back from these exceptions and pleas of the philosophers: openness and simplicity become goodness. Even if much of life remained, it would have to be carefully managed so that it might suffice for what is necessary; as it is, what madness it is to learn superfluous things in such poverty of time! Farewell.

In answer to the letter which you wrote me while travelling,—a letter as long as the journey itself,—I shall reply later. I ought to go into retirement, and consider what sort of advice I should give you. For you yourself, who consult me, also reflected for a long time whether to do so; how much more, then, should I myself reflect, since more deliberation is necessary in settling than in propounding a problem! And this is particularly true when one thing is advantageous to you and another to me. Am I speaking again in the guise of an Epicurean? But the fact is, the same thing is advantageous to me which is advantageous to you; for I am not your friend unless whatever is at issue concerning you is my concern also. Friendship produces between us a partnership in all our interests. There is no such thing as good or bad fortune for the individual; we live in common. And no one can live happily who has regard to himself alone and transforms everything into a question of his own utility; you must live for your neighbour, if you would live for yourself. This fellowship, maintained with scrupulous care, which makes us mingle as men with our fellow-men and holds that the human race have certain rights in common, is also of great help in cherishing the more intimate fellowship which is based on friendship, concerning which I began to speak above. For he that has much in common with a fellow-man will have all things in common with a friend. And on this point, my excellent Lucilius, I should like to have those subtle dialecticians of yours advise me how I ought to help a friend, or how a fellow-man, rather than tell me in how many ways the word “friend” is used, and how many meanings the word “man” possesses. Lo, Wisdom and Folly are taking opposite sides. Which shall I join? Which party would you have me follow? On that side, “man” is the equivalent of “friend"; on the other side, “friend” is not the equivalent of “man.” The one wants a friend for his own advantage; the other wants to make himself an advantage to his friend. What you have to offer me is nothing but distortion of words and splitting of syllables. It is clear that unless I can devise some very tricky premisses and by false deductions tack on to them a fallacy which springs from the truth, I shall not be able to distinguish between what is desirable and what is to be avoided! I am ashamed! Old men as we are, dealing with a problem so serious, we make play of it! “‘Mouse’ is a syllable. Now a mouse eats cheese; therefore, a syllable eats cheese.” Suppose now that I cannot solve this problem; see what peril hangs over my head as a result of such ignorance! What a scrape I shall be in! Without doubt I must beware, or some day I shall be catching syllables in a mousetrap, or, if I grow careless, a book may devour my cheese! Unless, perhaps, the following syllogism is shrewder still: “‘Mouse’ is a syllable. Now a syllable does not eat cheese. Therefore a mouse does not eat cheese.” What childish nonsense! Do we knit our brows over this sort of problem? Do we let our beards grow long for this reason? Is this the matter which we teach with sour and pale faces? Would you really know what philosophy offers to humanity? Philosophy offers counsel. Death calls away one man, and poverty chafes another; a third is worried either by his neighbour’s wealth or by his own. So-and-so is afraid of bad luck; another desires to get away from his own good fortune. Some are ill-treated by men, others by the gods. Why, then, do you frame for me such games as these? It is no occasion for jest; you are retained as counsel for unhappy mankind. You have promised to help those in peril by sea, those in captivity, the sick and the needy, and those whose heads are under the poised axe. Whither are you straying? What are you doing? This friend, in whose company you are jesting, is in fear. Help him, and take the noose from about his neck. Men are stretching out imploring hands to you on all sides; lives ruined and in danger of ruin are begging for some assistance; men’s hopes, men’s resources, depend upon you. They ask that you deliver them from all their restlessness, that you reveal to them, scattered and wandering as they are, the clear light of truth. Tell them what nature has made necessary, and what superfluous; tell them how simple are the laws that she has laid down, how pleasant and unimpeded life is for those who follow these laws, but how bitter and perplexed it is for those who have put their trust in opinion rather than in nature. I should deem your games of logic to be of some avail in relieving men’s burdens, if you could first show me what part of these burdens they will relieve. What among these games of yours banishes lust? Or controls it? Would that I could say that they were merely of no profit! They are positively harmful. I can make it perfectly clear to you whenever you wish, that a noble spirit when involved in such subtleties is impaired and weakened. I am ashamed to say what weapons they supply to men who are destined to go to war with fortune, and how poorly they equip them! Is this the path to the greatest good? Is philosophy to proceed by such claptrap and by quibbles which would be a disgrace and a reproach even for expounders of the law? For what else is it that you men are doing, when you deliberately ensnare the person to whom you are putting questions, than making it appear that the man has lost his case on a technical error? But just as the judge can reinstate those who have lost a suit in this way, so philosophy has reinstated these victims of quibbling to their former condition. Why do you men abandon your mighty promises, and, after having assured me in high-sounding language that you will permit the glitter of gold to dazzle my eyesight no more than the gleam of the sword, and that I shall, with mighty steadfastness, spurn both that which all men crave and that which all men fear, why do you descend to the ABC’s of scholastic pedants? What is your answer? Is this the path to heaven? For that is exactly what philosophy promises to me, that I shall be made equal to God. For this I have been summoned, for this purpose have I come. Philosophy, keep your promise! Therefore, my dear Lucilius, withdraw yourself as far as possible from these exceptions and objections of so-called philosophers. Frankness, and simplicity beseem true goodness. Even if there were many years left to you, you would have had to spend them frugally in order to have enough for the necessary things; but as it is, when your time is so scant, what madness it is to learn superfluous things! Farewell.

[1] Ad epistulam quam mihi ex itinere misisti, tam longam quam ipsum iter fuit, postea rescribam; seducere me debeo et quid suadeam circumspicere. Nam tu quoque, qui consulis, diu an consuleres cogitasti: quanto magis hoc mihi faciendum est, cum longiore mora opus sit ut solvas quaestionem quam ut proponas? utique cum aliud tibi expediat, aliud mihi. [2] Iterum ego tamquam Epicureus loquor? mihi vero idem expedit quod tibi: aut non sum amicus, nisi quidquid agitur ad te pertinens meum est. Consortium rerum omnium inter nos facit amicitia; nec secundi quicquam singulis est nec adversi; in commune vivitur. Nec potest quisquam beate degere qui se tantum intuetur, qui omnia ad utilitates suas convertit: alteri vivas oportet, si vis tibi vivere. [3] Haec societas diligenter et sancte observata, quae nos homines hominibus miscet et iudicat aliquod esse commune ius generis humani, plurimum ad illam quoque de qua loquebar interiorem societatem amicitiae colendam proficit; omnia enim cum amico communia habebit qui multa cum homine. [4] Hoc, Lucili virorum optime, mihi ab istis subtilibus praecipi malo, quid amico praestare debeam, quid homini, quam quot modis 'amicus' dicatur, et 'homo' quam multa significet. In diversum ecce sapientia et stultitia discedunt! cui accedo? in utram ire partem iubes? Illi homo pro amico est, huic amicus non est pro homine; ille amicum sibi parat, hic se amico: tu mihi verba distorques et syllabas digeris. [5] Scilicet nisi interrogationes vaferrimas struxero et conclusione falsa a vero nascens mendacium adstrinxero, non potero a fugiendis petenda secernere. Pudet me: in re tam seria senes ludimus. [Vale. SENECA LUCILIO SUO SALUTEM.] [6] 'Mus syllaba est; mus autem caseum rodit; syllaba ergo caseum rodit.' Puta nunc me istuc non posse solvere: quod mihi ex ista inscientia periculum imminet? quod incommodum? Sine dubio verendum est ne quando in muscipulo syllabas capiam, aut ne quando, si neglegentior fuero, caseum liber comedat. Nisi forte illa acutior est collectio: 'mus syllaba est; syllaba autem caseum non rodit; mus ergo caseum non rodit'. [7] O pueriles ineptias! in hoc supercilia subduximus? in hoc barbam demisimus? hoc est quod tristes docemus et pallidi? Vis scire quid philosophia promittat generi humano? consilium. Alium mors vocat, alium paupertas urit, alium divitiae vel alienae torquent vel suae; ille malam fortunam horret, hic se felicitati suae subducere cupit; hunc homines male habent, illum dii. Quid mihi lusoria ista componis? non est iocandi locus: ad miseros advocatus es. Opem laturum te naufragis, captis, aegris, egentibus, intentae securi subiectum praestantibus caput pollicitus es: quo diverteris? quid agis? Hic cum quo ludis timet: succurre, quidquid Ålaqueti respondentium poenisÅ. Omnes undique ad te manus tendunt, perditae vitae perituraeque auxilium aliquod implorant, in te spes opesque sunt; rogant ut ex tanta illos volutatione extrahas, ut disiectis et errantibus clarum veritatis lumen ostendas. [9] Dic quid natura necessarium fecerit, quid supervacuum, quam faciles <leges> posuerit, quam iucunda sit vita, quam expedita illas sequentibus, quam acerba et implicita eorum qui opinioni plus quam naturae crediderunt *** si prius docueris quam partem eorum levatura sint. Quid istorum cupiditates demit? quid temperat? Utinam tantum non prodessent! nocent. Hoc tibi cum voles manifestissimum faciam, comminui et debilitari generosam indolem in istas argutias coniectam. [10] Pudet dicere contra fortunam militaturis quae porrigant tela, quemadmodum illos subornent. Hac ad summum bonum itur? per istud philosophiae 'sive nive' et turpes infamesque etiam ad album sedentibus exceptiones? Quid enim aliud agitis, cum eum quem interrogatis scientes in fraudem inducitis, quam ut formula cecidisse videatur? Sed quemadmodum illos praetor, sic hos philosophia in integrum restituit. [11] Quid disceditis ab ingentibus promissis et grandia locuti, effecturos vos ut non magis auri fulgor quam gladii praestringat oculos meos, ut ingenti constantia et quod omnes optant et quod omnes timent calcem, ad grammaticorum elementa descenditis? Quid dicitis? Hoc enim est quod mihi philosophia promittit, ut parem deo faciat; ad hoc invitatus sum, ad hoc veni: fidem praesta. [12] Quantum potes ergo, mi Lucili, reduc te ab istis exceptionibus et praescriptionibus philosophorum: aperta decent et simplicia bonitatem. Etiam si multum superesset aetatis, parce dispensandum erat ut sufficeret necessariis: nunc quae dementia est supervacua discere in tanta temporis egestate! Vale.