Letter 124

(1) I could pass on to you many precepts of the ancients, if you do not shrink back and find it tiresome to learn such slender, painstaking concerns. But you do not shrink back, nor does any fine point of analysis drive you off: it is not consistent with your refinement to chase only after grand matters, just as I commend the fact that you reduce everything to some advancement, and that you are put off only when something is pursued with the utmost subtlety to no purpose. I shall take pains that even now this not be the case. The question is whether the good is grasped by the senses or by the understanding; bound up with this is the point that it does not exist in dumb animals and in infants. (2) Whoever set pleasure as the highest thing judge the good to be perceptible by sense; we, on the contrary, judge it intelligible, since we assign it to the mind. If the senses passed judgment on the good, we would reject no pleasure; for there is none that does not invite us, none that does not delight; and conversely we would willingly undergo no pain, for there is none that does not offend the sense. (3) Moreover, those to whom pleasure is too pleasing, and those for whom the fear of pain is supreme, would not deserve reproach. And yet we condemn men addicted to gluttony and lust, and we despise those who, for fear of pain, will dare nothing in a manly way. But how are they doing wrong if they obey the senses, that is, the judges of good and evil? For it is to these that you and your school have handed over the verdict on what to seek and what to flee. (4) But of course reason has been set in charge of this matter: just as it determines about the happy life, about virtue, about the honorable, so too it determines about good and evil. For among your school the verdict about the better thing is given to the most worthless part, so that the sense pronounces upon the good - a thing blunt and dull, and slower in man than in the other animals. (5) What if someone wished to distinguish minute objects not with the eyes but by touch? No keener and more intent edge of vision than the eyes' would let us tell good from evil. You see in how great an ignorance of the truth that man lives, and how he has flung down to the ground things lofty and divine, for whom touch passes judgment on the highest matter, on good and evil. (6) "Just as," he says, "every science and art ought to have something manifest and grasped by the sense, from which it arises and grows, so the happy life draws its foundation and its beginning from things manifest and from that which falls under the sense. Surely you yourselves say that the happy life takes its beginning from things manifest." (7) We say that those things are happy which are in accord with nature; but what is in accord with nature shows itself openly and at once, just as does what is whole. What is in accord with nature, what falls to a creature immediately upon its birth, I do not call the good, but the beginning of the good. You bestow the highest good, pleasure, upon infancy, so that the newborn begins at the very point where the completed man arrives; you put the treetop in the place of the root. (8) If someone were to say that the child still hidden in the mother's womb, of uncertain sex too, tender and unfinished and shapeless, is already in some good, he would plainly seem to be in error. And yet how little does it matter between the one who at this very moment receives life and the one who is the hidden burden of the mother's womb? Both, as far as the understanding of good and evil is concerned, are equally mature, and the infant is no more capable of the good than is a tree or some dumb animal. But why is there no good in a tree or a dumb animal? Because there is no reason. For this reason there is none in the infant either; for it too lacks reason. It will arrive at the good when it has arrived at reason. (9) There is a creature that is irrational; there is one not yet rational; there is one rational but imperfect: in none of these is the good, for reason brings it along with itself. What, then, separates these three? In that which is irrational the good will never be; in that which is not yet rational the good cannot then be; <in that which is rational> but imperfect the good can now be, but is not. (10) This is what I say, Lucilius: the good is not found in just any body, not at just any age, and it is as far removed from infancy as the last from the first, as the perfect from the beginning; therefore it is not in the tender little body that is only just now knitting together. Why should it not be? No more than it is in the seed. (11) You might put it thus: we know there is a certain good of a tree and of a planted crop; this is not in the first leaf which, just as it is put forth, breaks the soil. There is a certain good of wheat: it is not yet in the milky blade, nor when the soft ear works itself out of its sheath, but only when summer and its due ripeness have cooked the grain. Just as every nature does not yield its own good until it is brought to completion, so the good of man is not in man except when his reason is perfected. (12) But what is this good? I will say: a free mind, upright, subjecting other things to itself, itself to nothing. Infancy is so far from receiving this good that boyhood does not hope for it, and youth hopes for it presumptuously; it goes well with old age if by long and intent study it has reached it. If this is the good, it is also intelligible. (13) "You said," he objects, "that there is a certain good of a tree, a certain good of grass; therefore there can be one of an infant too." But the true good is neither in trees nor in dumb animals: what is good in them is called good only by sufferance. "What is it?" you ask. It is what is in accord with the nature of each. The good can in no way fall to a dumb animal; it belongs to a more fortunate and better nature. Except where there is room for reason, there is no good. (14) These are the four natures: of the tree, the animal, the man, the god. These two, which are rational, have the same nature; they differ in this, that the one is immortal, the other mortal. Of these, then, nature perfects the good of the one - of god, that is; care perfects that of the other - of man. The rest are perfect only in their own nature, not truly perfect, since reason is absent from them. For that alone is at last perfect which is perfect according to universal nature, and universal nature is rational: the rest can be perfect within their own kind. (15) In that which cannot contain the happy life, neither can that exist by which the happy life is brought about; and the happy life is brought about by goods. In a dumb animal there is no happy life <nor that by which the happy life> is brought about: in a dumb animal there is no good. (16) A dumb animal grasps present things by sense; it remembers past things when it falls upon something by which the sense is reminded, just as a horse remembers a road when it is brought to its starting point. In the stable, indeed, no road exists for it, however often the memory of the road it has trodden. But the third tense, that is, the future, does not pertain to dumb creatures. (17) How, then, can the nature of those be deemed perfect who have no use of perfect time? For time consists of three parts: past, present, and future. To animals only the present is given, which is the briefest and granted in the passing; the memory of the past is rare and is never recalled except by the occurrence of present things. (18) Therefore the good of a perfect nature cannot exist in an imperfect nature; or, if such a nature has this, then planted crops have it too. Nor do I deny that dumb animals have strong and vehement impulses toward the things that seem in accord with nature, but these are disordered and turbulent; the good, however, is never disordered or turbulent. (19) "What then?" you say, "do dumb animals move in a disturbed and disordered way?" I would say that they move in a disturbed and disordered way if their nature admitted of order: as it is, they move according to their own nature. For that is disturbed which can at some time also be not disturbed; that is anxious which can be at ease. There is vice for no creature except the one for whom virtue is possible: in dumb animals such motion comes from their very nature. (20) But, not to detain you long, there will be a certain good in a dumb animal, a certain virtue, something perfect, but neither the good absolutely, nor virtue, nor the perfect. For these fall to rational beings alone, to whom it is given to know why, how far, and in what manner. Thus the good is in nothing except in that which has reason. (21) You ask to what this discussion now tends, and what benefit it will bring your mind. I say: it both exercises and sharpens the mind, and at any rate keeps it occupied with an honorable task that will accomplish something. It is also of use insofar as it delays those who are hurrying toward what is base. But this too I say: I can in no way be of greater benefit to you than by showing you your own good, by separating you from the dumb animals, by placing you with god. (22) [...] (23) Will you not, leaving behind the things in which you must be beaten while you strive in another's domain, return to your own good? What is this? The mind, of course, set right and pure, a rival of god, lifting itself above human things, placing nothing of its own outside itself. You are a rational animal. What, then, is the good in you? Perfected reason. Summon this from here to its proper end, <let> it grow as much as it possibly can. (24) Judge yourself happy then, when all your joy is born to you out of yourself, when, looking upon the things that men snatch away, pray for, and guard, you find nothing - I do not say that you prefer, but that you even want. I will give you a brief formula by which to measure yourself, by which you may already feel that you are perfect: you will possess what is your own when you understand that the fortunate are the most unfortunate of all. Farewell.

Full many an ancient precept could I give, Didst thou not shrink, and feel it shame to learn Such lowly duties. But you do not shrink, nor are you deterred by any subtleties of study. For your cultivated mind is not wont to investigate such important subjects in a free-and-easy manner. I approve your method in that you make everything count towards a certain degree of progress, and in that you are disgruntled only when nothing can be accomplished by the greatest degree of subtlety. And I shall take pains to show that this is the case now also. Our question is, whether the Good is grasped by the senses or by the understanding; and the corollary thereto is that it does not exist in dumb animals or little children. Those who rate pleasure as the supreme ideal hold that the Good is a matter of the senses; but we Stoics maintain that it is a matter of the understanding, and we assign it to the mind. If the senses were to pass judgment on what is good, we should never reject any pleasure; for there is no pleasure that does not attract, no pleasure that does not please. Conversely, we should undergo no pain voluntarily; for there is no pain that does not clash with the senses. Besides, those who are too fond of pleasure and those who fear pain to the greatest degree would in that case not deserve reproof. But we condemn men who are slaves to their appetites and their lusts, and we scorn men who, through fear of pain, will dare no manly deed. But what wrong could such men be committing if they looked merely to the senses as arbiters of good and evil? For it is to the senses that you and yours have entrusted the test of things to be sought and things to be avoided! Reason, however, is surely the governing element in such a matter as this; as reason has made the decision concerning the happy life, and concerning virtue and honour also, so she has made the decision with regard to good and evil. For with them the vilest part is allowed to give sentence about the better, so that the senses—dense as they are, and dull, and even more sluggish in man than in the other animals,—pass judgment on the Good. Just suppose that one should desire to distinguish tiny objects by the touch rather than by the eyesight! There is no special faculty more subtle and acute than the eye, that would enable us to distinguish between good and evil. You see, therefore, in what ignorance of truth a man spends his days and how abjectly he has overthrown lofty and divine ideals, if he thinks that the sense of touch can pass judgment upon the nature of the Supreme Good and the Supreme Evil! He says: “Just as every science and every art should possess an element that is palpable and capable of being grasped by the senses (their source of origin and growth), even so the happy life derives its foundation and its beginnings from things that are palpable, and from that which falls within the scope of the senses. Surely you admit that the happy life takes its beginnings from things palpable to the senses.” But we define as “happy” those things that are in accord with Nature. And that which is in accord with Nature is obvious and can be seen at once—just as easily as that which is complete. That which is according to Nature, that which is given us as a gift immediately at our birth, is, I maintain, not a Good, but the beginning of a Good. You, however, assign the Supreme Good, pleasure, to mere babies, so that the child at its birth begins at the point whither the perfected man arrives. You are placing the tree-top where the root ought to be. If anyone should say that the child, hidden in its mother’s womb, of unknown sex too, delicate, unformed, and shapeless—if one should say that this child is already in a state of goodness, he would clearly seem to be astray in his ideas. And yet how little difference is there between one who has just lately received the gift of life, and one who is still a hidden burden in the bowels of the mother! They are equally developed, as far as their understanding of good or evil is concerned; and a child is as yet no more capable of comprehending the Good than is a tree or any dumb beast. But why is the Good non-existent in a tree or in a dumb beast? Because there is no reason there, either. For the same cause, then, the Good is non-existent in a child, for the child also has no reason; the child will reach the Good only when he reaches reason. There are animals without reason, there are animals not yet endowed with reason, and there are animals who possess reason, but only incompletely; in none of these does the Good exist, for it is reason that brings the Good in its company. What, then, is the distinction between the classes which I have mentioned? In that which does not possess reason, the Good will never exist. In that which is not yet endowed with reason, the Good cannot be existent at the time. And in that which possesses reason but only incompletely, the Good is capable of existing, but does not yet exist. This is what I mean, Lucilius: the Good cannot be discovered in any random person, or at any random age; and it is as far removed from infancy as last is from first, or as that which is complete from that which has just sprung into being. Therefore, it cannot exist in the delicate body, when the little frame has only just begun to knit together. Of course not—no more than in the seed. Granting the truth of this, we understand that there is a certain kind of Good of a tree or in a plant; but this is not true of its first growth, when the plant has just begun to spring forth out of the ground. There is a certain Good of wheat: it is not yet existent, however, in the swelling stalk, nor when the soft ear is pushing itself out of the husk, but only when summer days and its appointed maturity have ripened the wheat. Just as Nature in general does not produce her Good until she is brought to perfection, even so man’s Good does not exist in man until both reason and man are perfected. And what is this Good? I shall tell you: it is a free mind, an upright mind, subjecting other things to itself and itself to nothing. So far is infancy from admitting this Good that boyhood has no hope of it, and even young manhood cherishes the hope without justification; even our old age is very fortunate if it has reached this Good after long and concentrated study. If this, then, is the Good, the good is a matter of the understanding. “But,” comes the retort, “you admitted that there is a certain Good of trees and of grass; then surely there can be a certain Good of a child also.” But the true Good is not found in trees or in dumb animals the Good which exists in them is called “good” only by courtesy. “Then what is it?” you say. Simply that which is in accord with the nature of each. The real Good cannot find a place in dumb animals—not by any means; its nature is more blest and is of a higher class. And where there is no place for reason, the Good does not exist. There are four natures which we should mention here: of the tree, animal, man, and God. The last two, having reasoning power, are of the same nature, distinct only by virtue of the immortality of the one and the mortality of the other. Of one of these, then—to wit God—it is Nature that perfects the Good; of the other—to wit man—pains and study do so. All other things are perfect only in their particular nature, and not truly perfect, since they lack reason. Indeed, to sum up, that alone is perfect which is perfect according to nature as a whole, and nature as a whole is possessed of reason. Other things can be perfect according to their kind. That which cannot contain the happy life cannot contain that which produces the happy life; and the happy life is produced by Goods alone. In dumb animals there is not a trace of the happy life, nor of the means whereby the happy life is produced; in dumb animals the Good does not exist. The dumb animal comprehends the present world about him through his senses alone. He remembers the past only by meeting with something which reminds his senses; a horse, for example, remembers the right road only when he is placed at the starting-point. In his stall, however, he has no memory of the road, no matter how often he may have stepped along it. The third state—the future—does not come within the ken of dumb beasts. How, then, can we regard as perfect the nature of those who have no experience of time in its perfection? For time is three-fold,—past, present, and future. Animals perceive only the time which is of greatest moment to them within the limits of their coming and going—the present. Rarely do they recollect the past—and that only when they are confronted with present reminders. Therefore the Good of a perfect nature cannot exist in an imperfect nature; for if the latter sort of nature should possess the Good, so also would mere vegetation. I do not indeed deny that dumb animals have strong and swift impulses toward actions which seem according to nature, but such impulses are confused and disordered. The Good however, is never confused or disordered. “What!” you say, “do dumb animals move in disturbed and ill-ordered fashion?” I should say that they moved in disturbed and ill-ordered fashion, if their nature admitted of order; as it is, they move in accordance with their nature. For that is said to be “disturbed” which can also at some other time be “not disturbed”; so, too, that is said to be in a state of trouble which can be in a state of peace. No man is vicious except one who has the capacity of virtue; in the case of dumb animals their motion is such as results from their nature. But, not to weary you, a certain sort of good will be found in a dumb animal, and a certain sort of virtue, and a certain sort of perfection—but neither the Good, nor virtue, nor perfection in the absolute sense. For this is the privilege of reasoning beings alone, who are permitted to know the cause, the degree, and the means. Therefore, good can exist only in that which possesses reason. Do you ask now whither our argument is tending, and of what benefit it will be to your mind? I will tell you: it exercises and sharpens the mind, and ensures, by occupying it honourably, that it will accomplish some sort of good. And even that is beneficial which holds men back when they are hurrying into wickedness. However, I will say this also: I can be of no greater benefit to you than by revealing the Good that is rightly yours, by taking you out of the class of dumb animals, and by placing you on a level with God. Why, pray, do you foster and practise your bodily strength? Nature has granted strength in greater degree to cattle and wild beasts. Why cultivate your beauty? After all your efforts, dumb animals surpass you in comeliness. Why dress your hair with such unending attention? Though you let it down in Parthian fashion, or tie it up in the German style, or, as the Scythians do, let it flow wild—yet you will see a mane of greater thickness tossing upon any horse you choose, and a mane of greater beauty bristling upon the neck of any lion. And even after training yourself for speed, you will be no match for the hare. Are you not willing to abandon all these details—wherein you must acknowledge defeat, striving as you are for something that is not your own—and come back to the Good that is really yours? And what is this Good? It is a clear and flawless mind, which rivals that of God, raised far above mortal concerns, and counting nothing of its own to be outside itself. You are a reasoning animal. What Good, then, lies within you? Perfect reason. Are you willing to develop this to its farthest limits—to its greatest degree of increase? Only consider yourself happy when all your joys are born of reason, and when—having marked all the objects which men clutch at, or pray for, or watch over—you find nothing which you will desire; mind, I do not say prefer. Here is a short rule by which to measure yourself, and by the test of which you may feel that you have reached perfection: “You will come to your own when you shall understand that those whom the world calls fortunate are really the most unfortunate of all.” Farewell.

(1) Possum multa tibi ueterum praecepta referre, ni refugis tenuisque piget cognoscere curas. Non refugis autem nec ulla te subtilitas abigit: non est elegantiae tuae tantum magna sectari, sicut illud probo, quod omnia ad aliquem profectum redigis et tunc tantum offenderis ubi summa subtilitate nihil agitur. Quod ne nunc quidem fieri laborabo. Quaeritur utrum sensu conprendatur an intellectu bonum; huic adiunctumest in mutis animalibus et infantibus non esse. (2) Quicumque uoluptatem in summo ponunt sensibile iudicant bonum, nos contra intellegibile, qui illud animo damus. Si de bono sensus iudicarent, nullam uoluptatem reiceremus; nulla enim non inuitat, nulla non delectat; et e contrario nullum dolorem uolentes subiremus; nullus enim non offendit sensum. (3) Praeterea non essent digni reprehensione quibus nimium uoluptas placet quibusque summus est doloris timor. Atqui inprobamus gulae ac libidini addictos et contemni musillos qui nihil uiriliter ausuri sunt doloris metu. Quid autem peccant si sensibus, id est iudicibus boni ac mali, parent? his enim tradidistis ad petitionis et fugae arbitrium. (4) Sed uidelicet ratio isti rei praeposita est: illa quemadmodum de beata uita, quemadmodum de uirtute, de honesto, sic et de bono maloque constituit. Nam apud istos uilissimae parti datur de meliore sententia, ut de bono pronuntiet sensus, obtunsa res et hebes et in homine quam in aliis animalibus tardior. (5) Quid si quis uellet non oculis sed tactu minuta discernere? Subtilior adhoc acies nulla quam oculorum et intentior daret bonum malumque dinoscere. Vides in quanta ignorantia ueritatis uersetur et quam humi sublimia ac diuina proiecerit apud quem de summo, bono malo, iudicat tactus. (6) 'Quemadmodum' inquit 'omnis scientia atque ars aliquid debet habere manifestum sensuque conprehensum ex quo oriatur et crescat, sic beata uita fundamentum et initium a manifestis ducit et eo quod sub sensum cadat. Nempe uos a manifestis beatam uitam initium sui capere dicitis. ' (7) Dicimus beata esse quae secundum naturam sint; quid autem secundum naturam sit palam et protinus apparet, sicut quid sit integrum. Quod secundum naturam est, quod contigit protinus nato, non dico bonum, sed initium boni. Tu summum bonum, uoluptatem, infantiae donas, ut inde incipiat nascens quo consummatus homo peruenit; cacumen radicis loco ponis. (8) Si quis diceret illum in materno utero latentem, sexus quoque incerti, tenerum et inperfectum et informem iam in aliquo bono esse, aperte uideretur errare. Atqui quantulum interest inter eum qui cum (que) maxime uitam accipit et illum qui maternorum uiscerum latens onus est? Uterque, quantum ad intellectum boni ac mali, aeque maturus est, et non magis infans adhoc boni capax est quam arbor aut mutum aliquod animal. Quare autem bonum in arbore animalique muto non est? quia nec ratio. Ob hoc in infante quoque non est; nam et huic deest. Tunc ad bonum perueniet cum ad rationem peruenerit. (9) Est aliquod inrationale animal, est aliquod nondum rationale, est rationale sed inperfectum: in nullo horum bonum, ratio illud secum adfert. Quid ergo inter ista quaeret tuli distat? In eo quod inrationale est numquam erit bonum; in eo quod nondum rationale est tunc esse bonum non potest; <in eo quod rationale est> sed inperfectum iam potest bonum <esse>, sed non est. (10) Ita dico, Lucili: bonum non in quolibet corpore, non in qualibet aetate inuenitur et tantum abest ab infantia quantum a primo ultimum, quantum ab initio perfectum; ergo nec in tenero, modo coalescente corpusculo est. Quidni non sit? non magis quam in semine. (11) Hoc sic dicas: aliquod arboris ac sati bonum nouimus: hoc non est in prima fronde quae emissa cum maxime solum rumpit. Est aliquod bonum tritici: hoc nondum est in herba lactente nec cum folliculo se exerit spica mollis, sed cum frumentum aestas et debita maturitas coxit. Quemadmodum omnis natura bonum suum nisi consummata non profert, ita hominis bonum non est in homine nisi cum illi ratio perfecta est. (12) Quod autem hoc bonum? Dicam: liber animus, erectus, alia subiciens sibi, se nulli. Hoc bonum adeo non recipit infantia ut pueritia non speret, adulescentia inprobe speret; bene agitur cum senectute si ad illud longo studio intentoque peruenit. Si hoc est bonum, et intellegibile est. (13) 'Dixisti' inquit 'aliquod bonum esse arboris, aliquod herbae; potest ergo aliquod esse et infantis. ' Verum bonum nec in arboribus nec in mutis animalibus: hoc quod in illis bonum est precario bonum dicitur. 'Quod est? ' inquis. Hoc quod secundum cuiusque naturam est. Bonum quidem cadere in mutum animal nullo modo potest; felicioris meliorisque naturae est. Nisi ubi rationi locus est, bonum non est. (14) Quattuor hae naturae sunt, arboris, animalis, hominis, dei: haec duo, quae rationalia sunt, eandem naturam habent, illo diuersa sunt quod alterum inmortale, alterum mortale est. Ex his ergo unius bonum natura perficit, dei scilicet, alterius cura, hominis. Cetera tantum in sua natura perfecta sunt, non uere perfecta, a quibus abest ratio. Hoc enim demum perfectum est quod secundum uniuersam naturam perfectum, uniuersa autem natura rationalis est: cetera possunt in suo genere esse perfecta. (15) In quo non potest beata uita esse nec id potest quo beata uita efficitur; beata autem uita bonis efficitur. Inmuto animali non est beata uita <nec id quo beata uita> efficitur: inmuto animali bonum non est. (16) Mutum animal sensu conprendit praesentia; praeteritorum reminiscitur cum <in> id incidit quo sensus admoneretur, tamquam equus reminiscitur uiae cum ad initium eius admotus est. In stabulo quidem nulla illi uia est quamuis saepe calcatae memoria (est) . Tertium uero tempus, id est futurum, ad muta non pertinet. (17) Quomodo ergo potest eorum uideri perfecta natura quibus usus perfecti temporis non est? Tempus enim tribus partibus constat, praeterito, praesente, uenturo. Animalibus tantum quod breuissimum est <et> in transcursu datum, praesens: praeteriti rara memoria est nec umquam reuocatur nisi praesentium occursu. (18) Non potest ergo perfectae naturae bonum in inperfecta esse natura, aut si natura talis (habet) hoc habet, habent et sata. Nec illud nego, ad ea quae uidentur secundum naturam magnos esse mutis animalibus impetus et concitatos, sed inordinatos ac turbidos; numquam autem aut inordinatum est bonum aut turbidum. (19) 'Quid ergo?' inquis 'muta animalia perturbate et indisposite mouentur?' Dicerem illa perturbate et indisposite moueri si natura illorum ordinem caperet: nunc mouentur secundum naturam suam. Perturbatum enim id est quod esse aliquando et non perturbatum potest; sollicitum est quod potest esse securum. Nulli uitium est nisi cui uirtus potest esse: mutis animalibus talis ex natura sua motus est. (20) Sed ne te diu teneam, erit aliquod bonum in muto animali, erit aliqua uirtus, erit aliquid perfectum, sed nec bonum absolute nec uirtus nec perfectum. Haec enim rationalibus solis contingunt, quibus datum est scire quare, quatenus, quemadmodum. Ita bonum in nullo est nisi in quo ratio. (21) Quo nunc pertineat ista disputatio quaeris, et quid animo tuo profutura sit? Dico: et exercet illum et acuit et utique aliquid acturum occupatione honesta tenet. Prodest autem etiam quo moratur ad praua properantes. Sed <et> illud dico: nullo modo prodesse possum magis quam si tibi bonum tuum ostendo, si te a mutis animalibus separo, si cum deo pono. (22) . (23) Vis tu relictis in quibus uinci te necesse est, dum in aliena niteris, ad bonum reuerti tuum? Quod est hoc? animus scilicet emendatus ac purus, aemulator dei, super humana se extollens, nihil extra se sui ponens. Rationale animal es. Quod ergo in te bonum est? perfecta ratio. Hanc tu ad suum finem hinc euoca, <sine> in quantum potest plurimum crescere. (24) Tunc beatum esse te iudica cum tibi ex te gaudium omne nascetur, cum uisis quae homines eripiunt, optant, custodiunt, nihil inueneris, nondico quod malis, sed quod uelis. Breuem tibi formulam dabo qua te metiaris, qua perfectum esse iam sentias: tunc habebis tuum cum intelleges infelicissimos esse felices. Vale. Seneca the YoungerThe Latin Library The Classics Page