Lucius Annaeus Seneca→Lucilius Junior|c. 65 AD|Seneca the Younger|From Southern Italy (regional)|To Sicily (regional)|AI-assisted
It has often been asked whether it is better to have moderate emotions or none at all. Our school drives them out; the Peripatetics keep them in measure. For my part, I do not see how any half-measure of a disease can be healthy or useful. Have no fear: I am taking from you nothing that you would not want denied to you. I will show myself easy and indulgent toward the things you reach for, the things you judge necessary to life, or useful, or pleasant: I will only strip away the flaw. For once I have forbidden you to crave, I will allow you to wish, so that you may do those very same things without fear, with surer judgment, and may feel the pleasures themselves more keenly. Why should they not come to you more fully if you command them rather than serve them?
"But it is natural," you say, "for me to be tormented by longing for a friend: grant some right to tears that fall so justly. It is natural to be touched by men's opinions and to be saddened by their disapproval: so why not allow me this so-honorable dread of a bad reputation?" No vice lacks its defense; there is none whose beginning is not modest and easy to excuse, but from that beginning it spreads more widely. You will not succeed in making it stop if you have allowed it to start. Every emotion is feeble at first; then it stirs itself up and, as it advances, gathers strength: it is more easily shut out than driven out. Who denies that all the emotions flow from a sort of natural source? Nature has charged us with care for ourselves, but once you indulge this care too far, it becomes a vice. Nature has mixed pleasure into necessary things, not so that we should pursue it, but so that the addition of pleasure might make more welcome to us those things without which we cannot live: let pleasure come by its own right [as a by-product], and it is luxury. Therefore let us resist them as they come in, since, as I said, they are more easily kept out than gotten rid of.
"Allow me," you say, "to grieve up to a point, to fear up to a point." But that "up to a point" stretches far and does not accept the limit where you want it. For the wise man it is safe not to guard himself anxiously, and he will stop his tears and his pleasures wherever he pleases: but for us, because turning back is not easy, it is best not to advance at all. It seems to me that Panaetius answered elegantly a certain young man who asked whether the wise man would fall in love. "As for the wise man," he said, "we shall see; but for me and you, who are still far from the wise man, we must not risk falling into a thing that is agitated, uncontrollable, surrendered to another, and worthless to itself. For if the other person regards us, we are provoked by his kindness; if he scorns us, we are inflamed by our own pride. The ease of love harms us as much as its difficulty: by ease we are captured, with difficulty we struggle. And so, aware of our own weakness, let us keep still; let us not entrust a weak mind to wine, nor to beauty, nor to flattery, nor to any of the things that seductively draw us on." What Panaetius answered the man asking about love, I say about all the emotions: as far as we can, let us draw back from slippery ground; even on dry ground we stand none too firmly.
Here you will meet me with that public outcry against the Stoics: "You promise too much, you command things too harsh. We are mere little men; we cannot deny ourselves everything. We will grieve, but only a little; we will desire, but with restraint; we will grow angry, but we will be appeased." Do you know why we cannot do these things? Because we do not believe we can. No, by Hercules, there is something else at work in the matter: because we love our vices, we defend them, and we would rather excuse them than shake them off. Nature has given man strength enough, if only we use it, if only we gather our powers and rouse them all on our own behalf, or at least not against ourselves. The cause is unwillingness; inability is the pretext. Farewell.
The question has often been raised whether it is better to have moderate emotions, or none at all. Philosophers of our school reject the emotions; the Peripatetics keep them in check. I, however, do not understand how any half-way disease can be either wholesome or helpful. Do not fear; I am not robbing you of any privileges which you are unwilling to lose! I shall be kindly and indulgent towards the objects for which you strive—those which you hold to be necessary to our existence, or useful, or pleasant; I shall simply strip away the vice. For after I have issued my prohibition against the desires, I shall still allow you to wish that you may do the same things fearlessly and with greater accuracy of judgment, and to feel even the pleasures more than before; and how can these pleasures help coming more readily to your call, if you are their lord rather than their slave!
“But,” you object, “it is natural for me to suffer when I am bereaved of a friend; grant some privileges to tears which have the right to flow! It is also natural to be affected by men’s opinions and to be cast down when they are unfavourable; so why should you not allow me such an honourable aversion to bad opinion?”
There is no vice which lacks some plea; there is no vice that at the start is not modest and easily entreated; but afterwards the trouble spreads more widely. If you allow it to begin, you cannot make sure of its ceasing. Every emotion at the start is weak. Afterwards, it rouses itself and gains strength by progress; it is more easy to forestall it than to forgo it. Who does not admit that all the emotions flow as it were from a certain natural source? We are endowed by Nature with an interest in our own well-being; but this very interest, when overindulged, becomes a vice. Nature has intermingled pleasure with necessary things—not in order that we should seek pleasure, but in order that the addition of pleasure may make the indispensable means of existence attractive to our eyes. Should it claim rights of its own, it is luxury.
Let us therefore resist these faults when they are demanding entrance, because, as I have said, it is easier to deny them admittance than to make them depart. And if you cry: “One should be allowed a certain amount of grieving, and a certain amount of fear,” I reply that the “certain amount” can be too long-drawn-out, and that it will refuse to stop short when you so desire. The wise man can safely control himself without becoming over-anxious; he can halt his tears and his pleasures at will; but in our case, because it is not easy to retrace our steps, it is best not to push ahead at all. I think that Panaetius gave a very neat answer to a certain youth who asked him whether the wise man should become a lover: “As to the wise man, we shall see later; but you and I, who are as yet far removed from wisdom, should not trust ourselves to fall into a state that is disordered, uncontrolled, enslaved to another, contemptible to itself. If our love be not spurned, we are excited by its kindness; if it be scorned, we are kindled by our pride. An easily-won love hurts us as much as one which is difficult to win; we are captured by that which is compliant, and we struggle with that which is hard. Therefore, knowing our weakness, let us remain quiet. Let us not expose this unstable spirit to the temptations of drink, or beauty, or flattery, or anything that coaxes and allures.”
Now that which Panaetius replied to the question about love may be applied, I believe, to all the emotions. In so far as we are able, let us step back from slippery places; even on dry ground it is hard enough to take a sturdy stand. At this point, I know, you will confront me with that common complaint against the Stoics: “Your promises are too great, and your counsels too hard. We are mere manikins, unable to deny ourselves everything. We shall sorrow, but not to any great extent; we shall feel desires, but in moderation; we shall give way to anger, but we shall be appeased.” And do you know why we have not the power to attain this Stoic ideal? It is because we refuse to believe in our power. Nay, of a surety, there is something else which plays a part: it is because we are in love with our vices; we uphold them and prefer to make excuses for them rather than shake them off. We mortals have been endowed with sufficient strength by nature, if only we use this strength, if only we concentrate our powers and rouse them all to help us or at least not to hinder us. The reason is unwillingness, the excuse, inability. Farewell.
[1] Utrum satius sit modicos habere adfectus an nullos saepe quaesitum est. Nostri illos expellunt, Peripatetici temperant. Ego non video quomodo salubris esse aut utilis possit ulla mediocritas morbi. Noli timere: nihil eorum quae tibi non vis negari eripio. Facilem me indulgentemque praebebo rebus ad quas tendis et quas aut necessarias vitae aut utiles aut iucundas putas: detraham vitium. Nam cum tibi cupere interdixero, velle permittam, ut eadem illa intrepidus facias, ut certiore consilio, ut voluptates ipsas magis sentias: quidni ad te magis perventurae sint si illis imperabis quam si servies? [2] 'Sed naturale est' inquis 'ut desiderio amici torquear: da ius lacrimis tam iuste cadentibus. Naturale est opinionibus hominum tangi et adversis contristari: quare mihi non permittas hunc tam honestum malae opinionis metum?' Nullum est vitium sine patrocinio; nulli non initium verecundum est et exorabile, sed ab hoc latius funditur. Non obtinebis ut desinat si incipere permiseris. [3] Inbecillus est primo omnis adfectus; deinde ipse se concitat et vires dum procedit parat: excluditur facilius quam expellitur. Quis negat omnis adfectus a quodam quasi naturali fluere principio? Curam nobis nostri natura mandavit, sed huic ubi nimium indulseris, vitium est. Voluptatem natura necessariis rebus admiscuit, non ut illam peteremus, sed ut ea sine quibus non possumus vivere gratiora nobis illius faceret accessio: suo veniat iure, luxuria est. Ergo intrantibus resistamus, quia facilius, ut dixi, non recipiuntur quam exeunt. [4] 'Aliquatenus' inquis 'dolere, aliquatenus timere permitte.' Sed illud 'aliquatenus' longe producitur nec ubi vis accipit finem. Sapienti non sollicite custodire se tutum est, et lacrimas suas et voluptates ubi volet sistet: nobis, quia non est regredi facile, optimum est omnino non progredi. [5] Eleganter mihi videtur Panaetius respondisse adulescentulo cuidam quaerenti an sapiens amaturus esset. 'De sapiente' inquit 'videbimus: mihi et tibi, qui adhuc a sapiente longe absumus, non est committendum ut incidamus in rem commotam, inpotentem, alteri emancupatam, vilem sibi. Sive enim nos respicit, humanitate eius inritamur, sive contempsit, superbia accendimur. Aeque facilitas amoris quam difficultas nocet: facilitate capimur, cum difficultate certamus. Itaque conscii nobis inbecillitatis nostrae quiescamus; nec vino infirmum animum committamus nec formae nec adulationi nec ullis rebus blande trahentibus.' [6] Quod Panaetius de amore quaerenti respondit, hoc ego de omnibus adfectibus dico: quantum possumus nos a lubrico recedamus; in sicco quoque parum fortiter stamus.
[7] Occurres hoc loco mihi illa publica contra Stoicos voce: 'nimis magna promittitis, nimis dura praecipitis. Nos homunciones sumus; omnia nobis negare non possumus. Dolebimus, sed parum; concupiscemus, sed temperate; irascemur, sed placabimur.' [8] Scis quare non possimus ista? quia nos posse non credimus. Immo mehercules aliud est in re: vitia nostra quia amamus defendimus et malumus excusare illa quam excutere. Satis natura homini dedit roboris si illo utamur, si vires nostras colligamus ac totas pro nobis, certe non contra nos concitemus. Nolle in causa est, non posse praetenditur. Vale.
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It has often been asked whether it is better to have moderate emotions or none at all. Our school drives them out; the Peripatetics keep them in measure. For my part, I do not see how any half-measure of a disease can be healthy or useful. Have no fear: I am taking from you nothing that you would not want denied to you. I will show myself easy and indulgent toward the things you reach for, the things you judge necessary to life, or useful, or pleasant: I will only strip away the flaw. For once I have forbidden you to crave, I will allow you to wish, so that you may do those very same things without fear, with surer judgment, and may feel the pleasures themselves more keenly. Why should they not come to you more fully if you command them rather than serve them?
"But it is natural," you say, "for me to be tormented by longing for a friend: grant some right to tears that fall so justly. It is natural to be touched by men's opinions and to be saddened by their disapproval: so why not allow me this so-honorable dread of a bad reputation?" No vice lacks its defense; there is none whose beginning is not modest and easy to excuse, but from that beginning it spreads more widely. You will not succeed in making it stop if you have allowed it to start. Every emotion is feeble at first; then it stirs itself up and, as it advances, gathers strength: it is more easily shut out than driven out. Who denies that all the emotions flow from a sort of natural source? Nature has charged us with care for ourselves, but once you indulge this care too far, it becomes a vice. Nature has mixed pleasure into necessary things, not so that we should pursue it, but so that the addition of pleasure might make more welcome to us those things without which we cannot live: let pleasure come by its own right [as a by-product], and it is luxury. Therefore let us resist them as they come in, since, as I said, they are more easily kept out than gotten rid of.
"Allow me," you say, "to grieve up to a point, to fear up to a point." But that "up to a point" stretches far and does not accept the limit where you want it. For the wise man it is safe not to guard himself anxiously, and he will stop his tears and his pleasures wherever he pleases: but for us, because turning back is not easy, it is best not to advance at all. It seems to me that Panaetius answered elegantly a certain young man who asked whether the wise man would fall in love. "As for the wise man," he said, "we shall see; but for me and you, who are still far from the wise man, we must not risk falling into a thing that is agitated, uncontrollable, surrendered to another, and worthless to itself. For if the other person regards us, we are provoked by his kindness; if he scorns us, we are inflamed by our own pride. The ease of love harms us as much as its difficulty: by ease we are captured, with difficulty we struggle. And so, aware of our own weakness, let us keep still; let us not entrust a weak mind to wine, nor to beauty, nor to flattery, nor to any of the things that seductively draw us on." What Panaetius answered the man asking about love, I say about all the emotions: as far as we can, let us draw back from slippery ground; even on dry ground we stand none too firmly.
Here you will meet me with that public outcry against the Stoics: "You promise too much, you command things too harsh. We are mere little men; we cannot deny ourselves everything. We will grieve, but only a little; we will desire, but with restraint; we will grow angry, but we will be appeased." Do you know why we cannot do these things? Because we do not believe we can. No, by Hercules, there is something else at work in the matter: because we love our vices, we defend them, and we would rather excuse them than shake them off. Nature has given man strength enough, if only we use it, if only we gather our powers and rouse them all on our own behalf, or at least not against ourselves. The cause is unwillingness; inability is the pretext. Farewell.
AI-assisted translation - This translation was produced with AI assistance and has not been peer-reviewed. See the 19th-century translation or original Latin/Greek below for scholarly use.
Latin / Greek Original
[1] Utrum satius sit modicos habere adfectus an nullos saepe quaesitum est. Nostri illos expellunt, Peripatetici temperant. Ego non video quomodo salubris esse aut utilis possit ulla mediocritas morbi. Noli timere: nihil eorum quae tibi non vis negari eripio. Facilem me indulgentemque praebebo rebus ad quas tendis et quas aut necessarias vitae aut utiles aut iucundas putas: detraham vitium. Nam cum tibi cupere interdixero, velle permittam, ut eadem illa intrepidus facias, ut certiore consilio, ut voluptates ipsas magis sentias: quidni ad te magis perventurae sint si illis imperabis quam si servies? [2] 'Sed naturale est' inquis 'ut desiderio amici torquear: da ius lacrimis tam iuste cadentibus. Naturale est opinionibus hominum tangi et adversis contristari: quare mihi non permittas hunc tam honestum malae opinionis metum?' Nullum est vitium sine patrocinio; nulli non initium verecundum est et exorabile, sed ab hoc latius funditur. Non obtinebis ut desinat si incipere permiseris. [3] Inbecillus est primo omnis adfectus; deinde ipse se concitat et vires dum procedit parat: excluditur facilius quam expellitur. Quis negat omnis adfectus a quodam quasi naturali fluere principio? Curam nobis nostri natura mandavit, sed huic ubi nimium indulseris, vitium est. Voluptatem natura necessariis rebus admiscuit, non ut illam peteremus, sed ut ea sine quibus non possumus vivere gratiora nobis illius faceret accessio: suo veniat iure, luxuria est. Ergo intrantibus resistamus, quia facilius, ut dixi, non recipiuntur quam exeunt. [4] 'Aliquatenus' inquis 'dolere, aliquatenus timere permitte.' Sed illud 'aliquatenus' longe producitur nec ubi vis accipit finem. Sapienti non sollicite custodire se tutum est, et lacrimas suas et voluptates ubi volet sistet: nobis, quia non est regredi facile, optimum est omnino non progredi. [5] Eleganter mihi videtur Panaetius respondisse adulescentulo cuidam quaerenti an sapiens amaturus esset. 'De sapiente' inquit 'videbimus: mihi et tibi, qui adhuc a sapiente longe absumus, non est committendum ut incidamus in rem commotam, inpotentem, alteri emancupatam, vilem sibi. Sive enim nos respicit, humanitate eius inritamur, sive contempsit, superbia accendimur. Aeque facilitas amoris quam difficultas nocet: facilitate capimur, cum difficultate certamus. Itaque conscii nobis inbecillitatis nostrae quiescamus; nec vino infirmum animum committamus nec formae nec adulationi nec ullis rebus blande trahentibus.' [6] Quod Panaetius de amore quaerenti respondit, hoc ego de omnibus adfectibus dico: quantum possumus nos a lubrico recedamus; in sicco quoque parum fortiter stamus.
[7] Occurres hoc loco mihi illa publica contra Stoicos voce: 'nimis magna promittitis, nimis dura praecipitis. Nos homunciones sumus; omnia nobis negare non possumus. Dolebimus, sed parum; concupiscemus, sed temperate; irascemur, sed placabimur.' [8] Scis quare non possimus ista? quia nos posse non credimus. Immo mehercules aliud est in re: vitia nostra quia amamus defendimus et malumus excusare illa quam excutere. Satis natura homini dedit roboris si illo utamur, si vires nostras colligamus ac totas pro nobis, certe non contra nos concitemus. Nolle in causa est, non posse praetenditur. Vale.