Letter 108

[1] The matter you are asking about is one of those things where our only concern with knowing is to have the knowledge. Nevertheless, because it does concern us, you are in a hurry; you are unwilling to wait for the books that I am at this very moment putting in order, the ones that contain the whole department of moral philosophy. I will deal with it right away. But first I will write about how this eagerness to learn, which I see is burning in you, should be apportioned, so that it does not get in its own way. [2] Knowledge is not to be plucked at random, nor is the whole of it to be attacked greedily: one reaches the whole by way of the parts. The burden must be fitted to one's strength, and we should take on no more than we are able to carry through. You must drink in not as much as you want, but as much as you can hold. Only keep a sound mind: you will hold as much as you wish. The more the mind takes in, the more it stretches itself. [3] This, I recall, is what Attalus used to teach us, when we laid siege to his school, the first to come in and the last to go out, and when we would summon him even as he walked to take up various discussions, for he not only kept himself ready for his pupils but came to meet them halfway. 'The same purpose,' he said, 'ought to belong both to the teacher and to the learner: that the one wish to do good, the other to make progress.' [4] Whoever comes to a philosopher should carry off something good with him every day: he should go home either healthier or more curable. And he will go home so: such is the power of philosophy that it helps not only those who study it but even those who spend time with it. The man who comes into the sun, though he did not come for that purpose, will be given color; those who have sat in a perfumer's shop and lingered a little longer carry off the scent of the place with them; and those who have been with a philosopher must necessarily take away something that would do them good even if they were careless. Mark what I say: careless, not resistant. [5] 'What then? Do we not know certain men who have sat for many years at a philosopher's side and not so much as taken on a tinge of color?' Of course I know them: men most persistent and assiduous indeed, whom I call not the disciples of philosophers but their lodgers. [6] Some come to hear, not to learn, just as we are drawn into a theater for pleasure, to delight our ears with a speech or a voice or stories. You will see that a great part of the listeners are of this kind, for whom the philosopher's school is a lounging-place for their leisure. They are not there to lay aside any of their vices, to receive some rule of life by which to measure their conduct, but to enjoy to the full the gratification of their ears. Some, however, even come with notebooks, not to take down the substance but the words, which they repeat with as little benefit to others as they hear them without benefit to themselves. [7] Some are stirred up by grand utterances and pass over into the emotion of the speakers, eager in face and mind, and are roused no differently than the eunuch priests are wont to be by the sound of the Phrygian flute-player, raving on command. The beauty of the subject matter seizes and goads them on, not the sound of empty words. If something has been said sharply against death, if something has been said defiantly against Fortune, one delights to do at once what one hears. They are affected by such words and become what they are bidden to be, provided that this disposition remains in the mind, provided the populace, that dissuader from what is honorable, does not at once snatch away the striking impulse: few have been able to carry home the resolve they had conceived. [8] It is easy to rouse a listener to a desire for what is right; for nature has given everyone the foundations and the seed of the virtues. We are all born for all these things: when a prompter comes near, then those goods of the mind, as if asleep, are wakened. Do you not see how theaters resound in unison whenever something is said that we publicly acknowledge and by common consent attest to be true? [9] [verses on poverty and greed, here lost or omitted in the source] At verses like these, even the most sordid man applauds and rejoices that reproach is being heaped on his own vices: how much more, do you judge, does this happen when such things are spoken by a philosopher, when verses are woven into salutary precepts, which sink those same lessons more effectively into the minds of the untrained? [10] For as Cleanthes used to say, 'just as our breath gives back a clearer sound when the trumpet, drawing it through the narrows of its long channel, finally pours it out through a wider opening, so the tight constraint of song makes our meanings clearer.' The same things are heard more carelessly and strike less so long as they are spoken in loose prose: but when rhythms have been added and fixed feet have bound up an outstanding meaning, that same sentiment is hurled, as it were, with a more vigorous arm. [11] Many things are said about the contempt of money, and in the longest speeches this lesson is taught, that men should reckon riches to lie in the mind, not in one's estate, and that he is wealthy who has fitted himself to his poverty and made himself rich on a little; yet minds are struck more when verses of this kind have been spoken: [12] When we hear these things and the like, we are led to a confession of the truth; for even those for whom nothing is enough marvel, cry out, and proclaim their hatred of money. When you have seen this disposition in them, press it, push it, load it, leaving aside ambiguities and syllogisms and quibbles and the other useless toys of cleverness. Speak against greed, speak against luxury; when you see you have made progress and have moved the minds of your listeners, press on more forcefully: it is hard to believe how much such an address can accomplish when it is aimed at a cure and turned wholly to the good of the listeners. For tender natures are most easily won over to the love of what is honorable and right, and truth lays its hand upon those who are still teachable and only lightly corrupted, if she has found a suitable advocate. [13] I certainly, when I used to hear Attalus declaiming against vices, against errors, against the evils of life, often pitied the human race and believed him exalted and higher than the height of mankind. He himself said he was a king, but he seemed to me more than to reign, since he was permitted to exercise censorship over those who reign. [14] But when he had begun to commend poverty and to show how whatever exceeds need is a superfluous weight, burdensome to the one who carries it, often it pleased me to leave the school a poor man. When he had begun to reproach our pleasures, to praise the chaste body, the sober table, the mind pure not only from unlawful pleasures but even from superfluous ones, it pleased me to set limits to my appetite and my belly. [15] From this some habits have remained with me, Lucilius; for I had come to all these things with great impetus, and then, brought back to the life of the city, I kept a few of my good beginnings. From then on I renounced oysters and mushrooms for my whole life; for these are not food but enticements that compel the already full to eat (which is most welcome to gluttons and to those who stuff themselves beyond their capacity), easy to go down, easy to come back up. [16] From then on I abstain from perfume for my whole life, since the best scent on the body is none. From then on my stomach goes without wine. From then on I have fled the bath for my whole life; I have judged it both useless and self-indulgent to boil the body and drain it with sweat. Other abstinences I had thrown off have come back, yet in such a way that, in those whose abstinence I broke off, I keep a measure, and indeed one closer to abstinence, and perhaps more difficult, since some things are more easily cut off by the mind than tempered. [17] Since I have begun to set out for you with how much greater impetus I approached philosophy as a young man than I continue it as an old one, I will not be ashamed to confess what love of Pythagoras was instilled in me. Sotion used to say why Pythagoras abstained from animals, and why later Sextius did so. The reason was different for each, but for each it was magnificent. [18] Sextius believed that man had enough nourishment without bloodshed, and that a habit of cruelty is formed when butchery has been turned into a pleasure. He added that the material of luxury should be cut down; he reckoned that a varied diet was contrary to good health and foreign to our bodies. [19] But Pythagoras said that there is a kinship of all things with all things, and a commerce of souls passing into one form after another. According to him, no soul perishes, nor even rests, except for a brief time while it is being poured into another body. We shall see through what changes of time and when, after wandering through many dwellings, it returns into a man: meanwhile he instilled in men a fear of crime and of parricide, since they might unknowingly fall upon a parent's soul and violate it with iron or with teeth, if some kindred spirit were lodging in that body. [20] When Sotion had set this out and filled it with his arguments, he would say: 'Do you not believe that souls are distributed into one body after another, and that what we call death is a migration? Do you not believe that in these cattle or wild beasts or creatures sunk in water there lingers the soul that once belonged to a man? Do you not believe that nothing perishes in this world, but only changes its region? And that not only the heavenly bodies turn through fixed circuits, but that animals too pass through their cycles, and souls are driven around in an orbit? Great men have believed these things. [21] Therefore suspend your judgment, but keep everything intact for yourself. If these things are true, to have abstained from animals is innocence; if false, it is frugality. What loss is there to your credulity in this? I am taking from you the food of lions and vultures.' [22] Urged on by these arguments, I began to abstain from animals, and after a year had passed the habit was not only easy for me but sweet. I believed my mind was more active, and I could not affirm to you today whether it really was. You ask how I stopped? The time of my youth had fallen in the first part of the principate of Tiberius Caesar: foreign rites were then being suppressed, and among the proofs of superstition was reckoned abstinence from certain animals. And so, at the request of my father, who did not fear the slander but hated philosophy, I returned to my former practice; and he had no difficulty persuading me to dine better. [23] Attalus used to praise a mattress that resisted the body: I use such a one even as an old man, on which no impression can appear. I have related these things to prove to you how vehement are the first impulses of beginners toward all that is best, if someone exhorts them, if someone drives them on. But error is committed partly through the fault of the teachers, who teach us to debate, not to live, and partly through the fault of the learners, who bring to their teachers the aim of cultivating not their character but their cleverness. And so what was philosophy has been made philology. [24] But it makes a great difference with what intention you approach any matter. The man who is going to be a grammarian, examining Vergil, does not read that excellent passage with this mind: 'We must be watchful; unless we hurry we shall be left behind; the swift day drives us and is driven on; we are snatched along unawares; we arrange everything for the future and amid the precipices we move slowly': but rather he reads it in order to observe how often Vergil, when he speaks of the swiftness of time, uses this word, 'flees.' [25] The man who looks to philosophy brings these same lines to the use he should. 'Vergil never,' he says, 'says that the days go, but that they flee, which is the most rapid kind of running, and that all the best things are snatched away first: why then do we delay to rouse ourselves, so that we may match the speed of the swiftest of things? The better things fly past, the worse come on.' [26] Just as from a wine-jar the purest part flows out first, while the heaviest and most turbid settles at the bottom, so in our age what is best comes first. Shall we let it be drained off by others, so that we keep the dregs for ourselves? Let this cling to your mind and please you as though sent by an oracle: [27] Why the best? Because what remains is uncertain. Why the best? Because as young men we can learn, we can turn a mind that is supple and still pliable toward better things; because this time is fit for labors, fit for sharpening minds through study and exercising bodies through work: what is left over is more sluggish and feeble and nearer the end. Therefore let us pursue this with our whole mind, and, setting aside the things to which we are diverted, let us labor at one thing alone, lest we understand only too late, when we are left behind, the speed of this most rapid time, which we cannot hold back. Let each first day please us as the best and be made our own. [28] What flees must be seized. The man who reads that poem with a grammarian's eye does not consider this, that each first day is the best because diseases come on, because old age presses and stands over the heads even of those who are still thinking about youth, but he says that Vergil always places diseases and old age together, and indeed, by Hercules, not without reason: for old age is an incurable disease. [29] 'Besides,' he says, 'he has given old age this title, he calls it sad': There is no reason for you to wonder that each man gathers from the same material what suits his own studies: in the same meadow the ox seeks grass, the dog the hare, the stork the lizard. [30] When some philologist takes up Cicero's book On the Republic, and on one side a grammarian, on another a man devoted to philosophy, each directs his attention elsewhere. The philosopher marvels that so much could be said against justice. When the philologist comes to this same reading, he notes this: that there were two Roman kings, of whom one has no father and the other no mother. For there is doubt about the mother of Servius; Ancus is said to have no father and to be the grandson of Numa. [31] Besides, he notes that the man we call dictator, and whom we read so named in the histories, was among the ancients called 'master of the people.' This survives even today in the augural books, and the proof is that the one named by him is the 'master of the horse.' Likewise he notes that Romulus perished during an eclipse of the sun; that there was an appeal to the people even from the kings; that this is so in the pontifical books, and some think so too, including Fenestella. [32] When a grammarian explains these same books, he first enters in his commentary that 'reapse' is said by Cicero, that is, 're ipsa' [in actual fact], and no less 'sepse,' that is, 'se ipse' [himself]. Then he passes to those things that the usage of the age has changed, as when Cicero says, 'since we have been called back by his interruption from the very calx.' What we now in the circus call 'creta' [the chalk-line, the finish] the ancients called 'calx.' [33] Then he collects verses of Ennius, and first of all those written about Africanus: From this he says he understands that among the ancients 'opem' did not only mean help but also effort. For Ennius means, he says, that no one, neither citizen nor enemy, was able to give Scipio a reward worthy of his effort. [34] Then he counts himself fortunate that he has found the source from which it seemed good to Vergil to say: He says that Ennius stole this from Homer, and Vergil from Ennius; for there is in Cicero, in these very books On the Republic, this epigram of Ennius: [35] But lest I too, while doing something else, should slip into the philologist or the grammarian, I give this warning, that the hearing of philosophers and the reading of them must be drawn toward the aim of the happy life, not so that we may catch at archaic or invented words and improper metaphors and figures of speech, but so that we may gain useful precepts and grand and spirited utterances that may soon be transferred into action. Let us learn these things in such a way that what were words become deeds. [36] But I judge that no one deserves worse of all mortals than those who have learned philosophy as though it were some marketable craft, who live otherwise than they teach men to live. For they carry themselves around as examples of a useless training, liable to every vice that they attack. [37] No such teacher can help me any more than a helmsman who is seasick in a storm. The tiller must be held while the wave snatches at it, one must struggle with the sea itself, the sails must be torn from the wind: what help can the captain of the ship be to me if he is dazed and vomiting? How much greater, do you think, is the storm by which life is tossed than that which tosses any vessel? One must not talk but steer. [38] All the things they say, all that they fling out before a listening crowd, belong to others: Plato said them, Zeno said them, Chrysippus and Posidonius said them, and a huge column of names, so many and so great. I will show how they can prove that these things are their own: let them do what they have said. [39] Since I have now said the things I wished to convey to you, I will now satisfy your desire and carry over the matter you demanded, untouched, into another letter, so that you may not come weary to a thorny subject that should be heard with ears alert and attentive. Farewell.

The topic about which you ask me is one of those where our only concern with knowledge is to have the knowledge. Nevertheless, because it does so far concern us, you are in a hurry; you are not willing to wait for the books which I am at this moment arranging for you, and which embrace the whole department of moral philosophy. I shall send you the books at once; but I shall, before doing that, write and tell you how this eagerness to learn, with which I see you are aflame, should be regulated, so that it may not get in its own way. Things are not to be gathered at random; nor should they be greedily attacked in the mass; one will arrive at a knowledge of the whole by studying the parts. The burden should be suited to your strength, nor should you tackle more than you can adequately handle. Absorb not all that you wish, but all that you can hold. Only be of a sound mind, and then you will be able to hold all that you wish. For the more the mind receives, the more does it expand. This was the advice, I remember, which Attalus gave me in the days when I practically laid siege to his class-room, the first to arrive and the last to leave. Even as he paced up and down, I would challenge him to various discussions; for he not only kept himself accessible to his pupils, but met them half-way. His words were: “The same purpose should possess both master and scholar—an ambition in the one case to promote, and in the other to progress.” He who studies with a philosopher should take away with him some one good thing every day: he should daily return home a sounder man, or in the way to become sounder. And he will thus return; for it is one of the functions of philosophy to help not only those who study her, but those also who associate with her. He that walks in the sun, though he walk not for that purpose, must needs become sunburned. He who frequents the perfumer’s shop and lingers even for a short time, will carry with him the scent of the place. And he who follows a philosopher is bound to derive some benefit therefrom, which will help him even though he be remiss. Mark what I say: “remiss,” not “recalcitrant.” “What then?” you say, “do we not know certain men who have sat for many years at the feet of a philosopher and yet have not acquired the slightest tinge of wisdom?” Of course I know such men. There are indeed persevering gentlemen who stick at it; I do not call them pupils of the wise, but merely “squatters.” Certain of them come to hear and not to learn, just as we are attracted to the theatre to satisfy the pleasures of the ear, whether by a speech, or by a song, or by a play. This class, as you will see, constitutes a large part of the listeners,—who regard the philosopher’s lecture-room merely as a sort of lounging-place for their leisure. They do not set about to lay aside any faults there, or to receive a rule of life, by which they may test their characters; they merely wish to enjoy to the full the delights of the ear. And yet some arrive even with notebooks, not to take down the matter, but only the words, that they may presently repeat them to others with as little profit to these as they themselves received when they heard them. A certain number are stirred by high-sounding phrases, and adapt themselves to the emotions of the speaker with lively change of face and mind—just like the emasculated Phrygian priests who are wont to be roused by the sound of the flute and go mad to order. But the true hearer is ravished and stirred by the beauty of the subject matter, not by the jingle of empty words. When a bold word has been uttered in defiance of death, or a saucy fling in defiance of Fortune, we take delight in acting straightway upon that which we have heard. Men are impressed by such words, and become what they are bidden to be, should but the impression abide in the mind, and should the populace, who discourage honourable things, not immediately lie in wait to rob them of this noble impulse; only a few can carry home the mental attitude with which they were inspired. It is easy to rouse a listener so that he will crave righteousness; for Nature has laid the foundations and planted the seeds of virtue in us all. And we are all born to these general privileges; hence, when the stimulus is added, the good spirit is stirred as if it were freed from bonds. Have you not noticed how the theatre re-echoes whenever any words are spoken whose truth we appreciate generally and confirm unanimously? The poor lack much; the greedy man lacks all. A greedy man does good to none; he does Most evil to himself. At such verses as these, your meanest miser claps applause and rejoices to hear his own sins reviled. How much more do you think this holds true, when such things are uttered by a philosopher, when he introduces verses among his wholesome precepts, that he may thus make those verses sink more effectively into the mind of the neophyte! Cleanthes used to say: “As our breath produces a louder sound when it passes through the long and narrow opening of the trumpet and escapes by a hole which widens at the end, even so the fettering rules of poetry clarify our meaning.” The very same words are more carelessly received and make less impression upon us, when they are spoken in prose; but when metre is added and when regular prosody has compressed a noble idea, then the selfsame thought comes, as it were, hurtling with a fuller fling. We talk much about despising money, and we give advice on this subject in the lengthiest of speeches, that mankind may believe true riches to exist in the mind and not in one’s bank account, and that the man who adapts himself to his slender means and makes himself wealthy on a little sum, is the truly rich man; but our minds are struck more effectively when a verse like this is repeated: He needs but little who desires but little. or, He hath his wish, whose wish includeth naught Save that which is enough. When we hear such words as these, we are led towards a confession of the truth. Even men in whose opinion nothing is enough, wonder and applaud when they hear such words, and swear eternal hatred against money. When you see them thus disposed, strike home, keep at them, and charge them with this duty, dropping all double meanings, syllogisms, hair-splitting, and the other side-shows of ineffective smartness. Preach against greed, preach against high living; and when you notice that you have made progress and impressed the minds of your hearers, lay on still harder. You cannot imagine how much progress can be brought about by an address of that nature, when you are bent on curing your hearers and are absolutely devoted to their best interests. For when the mind is young, it may most easily be won over to desire what is honourable and upright; truth, if she can obtain a suitable pleader, will lay strong hands upon those who can still be taught, those who have been but superficially spoiled. At any rate, when I used to hear Attalus denouncing sin, error, and the evils of life, I often felt sorry for mankind and regarded Attalus as a noble and majestic being,—above our mortal heights. He called himself a king, but I thought him more than a king, because he was entitled to pass judgment on kings. And in truth, when he began to uphold poverty, and to show what a useless and dangerous burden was everything that passed the measure of our need, I often desired to leave his lecture-room a poor man. Whenever he castigated our pleasure-seeking lives, and extolled personal purity, moderation in diet, and a mind free from unnecessary, not to speak of unlawful, pleasures, the desire came upon me to limit my food and drink. And that is why some of these habits have stayed with me, Lucilius. For I had planned my whole life with great resolves. And later, when I returned to the duties of a citizen, I did indeed keep a few of these good resolutions. That is why I have forsaken oysters and mushrooms for ever: since they are not really food, but are relishes to bully the sated stomach into further eating, as is the fancy of gourmands and those who stuff themselves beyond their powers of digestion: down with it quickly, and up with it quickly! That is why I have also throughout my life avoided perfumes; because the best scent for the person is no scent at all. That is why my stomach is unacquainted with wine. That is why throughout my life I have shunned the bath, and have believed that to emaciate the body and sweat it into thinness is at once unprofitable and effeminate. Other resolutions have been broken, but after all in such a way that, in cases where I ceased to practice abstinence, I have observed a limit which is indeed next door to abstinence; perhaps it is even a little more difficult, because it is easier for the will to cut off certain things utterly than to use them with restraint. Inasmuch as I have begun to explain to you how much greater was my impulse to approach philosophy in my youth than to continue it in my old age, I shall not be ashamed to tell you what ardent zeal Pythagoras inspired in me. Sotion used to tell me why Pythagoras abstained from animal food, and why, in later times, Sextius did also. In each case, the reason was different, but it was in each case a noble reason. Sextius believed that man had enough sustenance without resorting to blood, and that a habit of cruelty is formed whenever butchery is practised for pleasure. Moreover, he thought we should curtail the sources of our luxury; he argued that a varied diet was contrary to the laws of health, and was unsuited to our constitutions. Pythagoras, on the other hand, held that all beings were inter-related, and that there was a system of exchange between souls which transmigrated from one bodily shape into another. If one may believe him, no soul perishes or ceases from its functions at all, except for a tiny interval—when it is being poured from one body into another. We may question at what time and after what seasons of change the soul returns to man, when it has wandered through many a dwelling-place; but meantime, he made men fearful of guilt and parricide, since they might be, without knowing it, attacking the soul of a parent and injuring it with knife or with teeth—if, as is possible, the related spirit be dwelling temporarily in this bit of flesh! When Sotion had set forth this doctrine, supplementing it with his own proofs, he would say: “You do not believe that souls are assigned, first to one body and then to another, and that our so-called death is merely a change of abode? You do not believe that in cattle, or in wild beasts, or in creatures of the deep, the soul of him who was once a man may linger? You do not believe that nothing on this earth is annihilated, but only changes its haunts? And that animals also have cycles of progress and, so to speak, an orbit for their souls, no less than the heavenly bodies, which revolve in fixed circuits? Great men have put faith in this idea; therefore, while holding to your own view, keep the whole question in abeyance in your mind. If the theory is true, it is a mark of purity to refrain from eating flesh; if it be false, it is economy. And what harm does it do to you to give such credence? I am merely depriving you of food which sustains lions and vultures.” I was imbued with this teaching, and began to abstain from animal food; at the end of a year the habit was as pleasant as it was easy. I was beginning to feel that my mind was more active; though I would not to-day positively state whether it really was or not. Do you ask how I came to abandon the practice? It was this way: The days of my youth coincided with the early part of the reign of Tiberius Caesar. Some foreign rites were at that time being inaugurated, and abstinence from certain kinds of animal food was set down as a proof of interest in the strange cult. So at the request of my father, who did not fear prosecution, but who detested philosophy, I returned to my previous habits; and it was no very hard matter to induce me to dine more comfortably. Attalus used to recommend a pillow which did not give in to the body; and now, old as I am, I use one so hard that it leaves no trace after pressure. I have mentioned all this in order to show you how zealous neophytes are with regard to their first impulses towards the highest ideals, provided that some one does his part in exhorting them and in kindling their ardour. There are indeed mistakes made, through the fault of our advisers, who teach us how to debate and not how to live; there are also mistakes made by the pupils, who come to their teachers to develop, not their souls, but their wits. Thus the study of wisdom has become the study of words. Now it makes a great deal of difference what you have in mind when you approach a given subject. If a man is to be a scholar, and is examining the works of Vergil, he does not interpret the noble passage Time flies away, and cannot be restored in the following sense: “We must wake up; unless we hasten, we shall be left behind. Time rolls swiftly ahead, and rolls us with it. We are hurried along ignorant of our destiny; we arrange all our plans for the future, and on the edge of a precipice are at our ease.” Instead of this, he brings to our attention how often Vergil, in speaking of the rapidity of time, uses the word “flies” (fugit). The choicest days of hapless human life Fly first; disease and bitter eld succeed, And toil, till harsh death rudely snatches all. He who considers these lines in the spirit of a philosopher comments on the words in their proper sense: “Vergil never says, ‘Time goes,’ but ‘Time flies,’ because the latter is the quickest kind of movement, and in every case our best days are the first to be snatched away; why, then, do we hesitate to bestir ourselves so that we may be able to keep pace with this swiftest of all swift things?” The good flies past and the bad takes its place. Just as the purest wine flows from the top of the jar and the thickest dregs settle at the bottom; so in our human life, that which is best comes first. Shall we allow other men to quaff the best, and keep the dregs for ourselves? Let this phrase cleave to your soul; you should be satisfied thereby as if it were uttered by an oracle: Each choicest day of hapless human life Flies first. Why “choicest day”? Because what’s to come is unsure. Why “choicest day”? Because in our youth we are able to learn; we can bend to nobler purposes minds that are ready and still pliable; because this is the time for work, the time for keeping our minds busied in study and in exercising our bodies with useful effort; for that which remains is more sluggish and lacking in spirit—nearer the end. Let us therefore strive with all courage, omitting attractions by the way; let us struggle with a single purpose, lest, when we are left behind, we comprehend too late the speed of quick-flying time, whose course we cannot stay. Let every day, as soon as it comes, be welcome as being the choicest, and let it be made our own possession. We must catch that which flees. Now he who scans with a scholar’s eye the lines I have just quoted, does not reflect that our first days are the best because disease is approaching and old age weighs upon us and hangs over our heads while we are still thinking about our youth. He thinks rather of Vergil’s usual collocation of disease and eld; and indeed rightly. For old age is a disease which we cannot cure. “Besides,” he says to himself, “think of the epithet that accompanies eld; Vergil calls it bitter,”— Disease and bitter eld succeed. And elsewhere Vergil says: There dwelleth pale disease and bitter eld. There is no reason why you should marvel that each man can collect from the same source suitable matter for his own studies; for in the same meadow the cow grazes, the dog hunts the hare, and the stork the lizard. When Cicero’s book On the State is opened by a philologist, a scholar, or a follower of philosophy, each man pursues his investigation in his own way. The philosopher wonders that so much could have been said therein against justice. The philologist takes up the same book and comments on the text as follows: There were two Roman kings—one without a father and one without a mother. For we cannot settle who was Servius’s mother, and Ancus, the grandson of Numa, has no father on record. The philologist also notes that the officer whom we call dictator, and about whom we read in our histories under that title, was named in old times the magister populi; such is the name existing to-day in the augural records, proved by the fact that he whom the dictator chose as second in command was called magister equitum. He will remark, too, that Romulus met his end during an eclipse; that there was an appeal to the people even from the kings (this is so stated in the pontiffs’ register and is the opinion of others, including Fenestella). When the scholar unrolls this same volume, he puts down in his notebook the forms of words, noting that reapse, equivalent to re ipsa, is used by Cicero, and sepse just as frequently, which means se ipse. Then he turns his attention to changes in current usage. Cicero, for example, says: “Inasmuch as we are summoned back from the very calx by his interruption.” Now the line in the circus which we call the creta was called the calx by men of old time. Again, he puts together some verses by Ennius, especially those which referred to Africanus: A man to whom nor friend nor foe could give Due meed for all his efforts and his deed. From this passage the scholar declares that he infers the word opem to have meant formerly not merely assistance, but efforts. For Ennius must mean that neither friend nor foe could pay Scipio a reward worthy of his efforts. Next, he congratulates himself on finding the source of Vergil’s words: Over whose head the mighty gate of Heaven Thunders, remarking that Ennius stole the idea from Homer, and Vergil from Ennius. For there is a couplet by Ennius, preserved in this same book of Cicero’s, On the State: If it be right for a mortal to scale the regions of Heaven, Then the huge gate of the sky opens in glory to me. But that I, too, while engaged upon another task, may not slip into the department of the philologist or the scholar, my advice is this—that all study of philosophy and all reading should be applied to the idea of living the happy life, that we should not hunt out archaic or far-fetched words and eccentric metaphors and figures of speech, but that we should seek precepts which will help us, utterances of courage and spirit which may at once be turned into facts. We should so learn them that words may become deeds. And I hold that no man has treated mankind worse than he who has studied philosophy as if it were some marketable trade, who lives in a different manner from that which he advises. For those who are liable to every fault which they castigate advertise themselves as patterns of useless training. A teacher like that can help me no more than a sea-sick pilot can be efficient in a storm. He must hold the tiller when the waves are tossing him; he must wrestle, as it were, with the sea; he must furl his sails when the storm rages; what good is a frightened and vomiting steersman to me? And how much greater, think you, is the storm of life than that which tosses any ship! One must steer, not talk. All the words that these men utter and juggle before a listening crowd, belong to others. They have been spoken by Plato, spoken by Zeno, spoken by Chrysippus or by Posidonius, and by a whole host of Stoics as numerous as excellent. I shall show you how men can prove their words to be their own: it is by doing what they have been talking about. Since therefore I have given you the message I wished to pass on to you, I shall now satisfy your craving and shall reserve for a new letter a complete answer to your summons; so that you may not approach in a condition of weariness a subject which is thorny and which should be followed with an attentive and painstaking ear. Farewell.

[1] Id de quo quaeris ex iis est quae scire tantum eo, ut scias, pertinet. Sed nihilominus, quia pertinet, properas nec vis expectare libros quoscum maxime ordino continentis totam moralem philosophiae partem. Statim expediam; illud tamen prius scribam, quemadmodum tibi ista cupiditas discendi, qua flagrare te video, digerenda sit, ne ipsa se inpediat. [2] Nec passim carpenda sunt nec avide invadenda universa: per partes pervenietur ad totum. Aptari onus viribus debet nec plus occupari quam cui sufficere possimus. Non quantum vis sed quantum capis hauriendum est. Bonum tantum habe animum: capies quantum voles. Quo plus recipit animus, hoc se magis laxat. [3] Haec nobis praecipere Attalum memini, cum scholam eius obsideremus et primi veniremus et novissimi exiremus, ambulantem quoque illum ad aliquas disputationes evocaremus, non tantum paratum discentibus sed obvium. 'Idem' inquit 'et docenti et discenti debet esse propositum, ut ille prodesse velit, hic proficere.' [4] Qui ad philosophum venit cotidie aliquid secum boni ferat: aut sanior domum redeat aut sanabilior. Redibit autem: ea philosophiae vis est ut non studentis sed etiam conversantis iuvet. Qui in solem venit, licet non in hoc venerit, colorabitur; qui in unguentaria taberna resederuntet paullo diutius commorati sunt odorem secum loci ferunt; et qui ad philosophum fuerunt traxerint aliquid necesse est quod prodesset etiam neglegentibus. Attende quid dicam: neglegentibus, non repugnantibus. [5] 'Quid ergo? non novimus quosdam qui multis apud philosophum annis persederint et ne colorem quidem duxerint? ' Quidni noverim? pertinacissimos quidem et adsiduos, quos ego non discipulos philosophorum sed inquilinos voco. [6] Quidam veniunt ut audiant, non ut discant, sicut in theatrum voluptatis causa ad delectandas aures oratione vel voce vel fabulis ducimur. Magnam hanc auditorum partem videbis cui philosophi schola deversorium otii sit. Non id agunt ut aliqua illo vitia deponant, ut aliquam legemvitae accipiant qua mores suos exigant, sed ut oblectamento aurium perfruantur. Aliqui tamen et cum pugillaribus veniunt, non ut res excipiant, sed ut verba, quae tam sine profectu alieno dicant quam sine suo audiunt. [7]Quidam ad magnificas voces excitantur et transeunt in adfectum dicentium alacres vultu et animo, nec aliter concitantur quam solent Phrygii tibicinis sono semiviri et ex imperio furentes. Rapit illos instigatque rerum pulchritudo, non verborum inanium sonitus. Si quid acriter contra mortem dictum est, si quid contra fortunam contumaciter, iuvat protinus quae audias facere. Adficiuntur illis et sunt quales iubentur, si illa animo forma permaneat, si non impetum insignem protinus populus, honesti dissuasor, excipiat: pauci illam quam conceperant mentem domum perferre potuerunt. [8] Facile est auditorem concitare ad cupidinem recti; omnibus enim natura fundamenta dedit semenque virtutum. Omnes ad omnia ista nati sumus: cum inritator accessit, tunc illa animi bona veluti sopita excitantur. Non vides quemadmodum theatra consonent quotiens aliqua dicta sunt quae publice adgnoscimus etconsensu vera esse testamur? [9] Ad hos versus ille sordidissimus plaudit et vitiis suis fieri convicium gaudet: quanto magis hoc iudicas evenire cum a philosopho ista dicuntur, cum salutaribus praeceptis versus inseruntur, efficacius eadem illa demissuri in animum inperitorum? [10] Nam ut dicebat Cleanthes, 'quemadmodum spiritus noster clariorem sonum reddit cum illum tuba per longi canalis angustias tractum patentiore novissime exitu effudit, sic sensus nostros clariores carminis arta necessitas efficit. ' Eadem neglegentius audiuntur minusque percutiunt quamdiu soluta oratione dicuntur: ubi accessere numeri et egregium sensum adstrinxere certi pedes, eadem illa sententia velut lacerto excussiore torquetur. [11] De contemptu pecuniae multa dicuntur et longissimis orationibus hoc praecipitur, ut homines in animo, non in patrimonio putent esse divitias, eum esse locupletem qui paupertati suae aptatus est et parvo se divitem fecit; magis tamen feriuntur animi cum carmina eiusmodi dicta sunt: [12] Cum haec atque eiusmodi audimus, ad confessionem veritatis adducimur;illi enim quibus nihil satis est admirantur, adclamant, odium pecuniaeindicunt. Hunc illorum adfectum cum videris, urge, hoc preme, hoc onera, relictis ambiguitatibus et syllogismis et cavillationibus et ceteris acuminisinriti ludicris. Dic in avaritiam, dic in luxuriam; cum profecisse te videriset animos audientium adfeceris, insta vehementius: veri simile non estquantum proficiat talis oratio remedio intenta et tota in bonum audientiumversa. Facillime enim tenera conciliantur ingenia ad honesti rectique amorem, et adhuc docilibus leviterque corruptis inicit manum veritas si advocatumidoneum nacta est. [13] Ego certe cum Attalum audirem in vitia, in errores, in mala vitae perorantem, saepe miseritus sum generis humani et illum sublimemaltioremque humano fastigio credidi. Ipse regem se esse dicebat, sed plusquam regnare mihi videbatur cui liceret censuram agere regnantium. [14] Cum vero commendare paupertatem coeperat et ostendere quam quidquid usumexcederet pondus esset supervacuum et grave ferenti, saepe exire e scholapauperi libuit. Cum coeperat voluptates nostras traducere, laudare castumcorpus, sobriam mensam, puram mentem non tantum ab inlicitis voluptatibus sed etiam supervacuis, libebat circumscribere gulam ac ventrem. [15] Indemihi quaedam permansere, Lucili; magno enim in omnia impetu veneram, deindead civitatis vitam reductus ex bene coeptis pauca servavi. Inde ostreisboletisque in omnem vitam renuntiatum est; nec enim cibi sed oblectamenta sunt ad edendum saturos cogentia (quod gratissimum est edacibus et se ultraquam capiunt farcientibus), facile descensura, facile reditura. [16] Indein omnem vitam unguento abstinemus, quoniam optimus odor in corpore estnullus. Inde vino carens stomachus. Inde in omnem vitam balneum fugimus;decoquere corpus atque exinanire sudoribus inutile simul delicatumque credidimus. Cetera proiecta redierunt, ita tamen ut quorum abstinentiam interrupi modumservem et quidem abstinentiae proximiorem, nescio an difficiliorem, quoniamquaedam absciduntur facilius animo quam temperantur. [17] Quoniam coepi tibi exponere quanto maiore impetu ad philosophiamiuvenis accesserim quam senex pergam, non pudebit fateri quem mihi amoremPythagoras iniecerit. Sotion dicebat quare ille animalibus abstinuisset, quare postea Sextius. Dissimilis utrique causa erat, sed utrique magnifica. [18] Hic homini satis alimentorum citra sanguinem esse credebat et crudelitatisconsuetudinem fieri ubi in voluptatem esset adducta laceratio. Adiciebatcontrahendam materiam esse luxuriae; colligebat bonae valetudini contrariaesse alimenta varia et nostris aliena corporibus. [19] At Pythagoras omniuminter omnia cognationem esse dicebat et animorum commercium in alias atquealias formas transeuntium. Nulla, si illi credas, anima interit, ne cessatquidem nisi tempore exiguo, dum in aliud corpus transfunditur. Videbimusper quas temporum vices et quando pererratis pluribus domiciliis in hominemrevertatur: interim sceleris hominibus ac parricidii metum fecit, cum possentin parentis animam inscii incurrere et ferro morsuve violare, si in quo<corpore> cognatus aliqui spiritus hospitaretur. [20] Haec cum exposuissetSotion et implesset argumentis suis, 'non credis' inquit 'animas in aliacorpora atque alia discribi et migrationem esse quod dicimus mortem? Noncredis in his pecudibus ferisve aut aqua mersis illum quondam hominis animummorari? Non credis nihil perire in hoc mundo, sed mutare regionem? nectantum caelestia per certos circuitus verti, sed animalia quoque per vicesire et animos per orbem agi? Magni ista crediderunt viri. [21] Itaque iudiciumquidem tuum sustine, ceterum omnia tibi in integro serva. Si vera suntista, abstinuisse animalibus innocentia est; si falsa, frugalitas est. Quod istic credulitatis tuae damnum est? alimenta tibi leonum et vulturumeripio. ' [22] His ego instinctus abstinere animalibus coepi, et anno peractonon tantum facilis erat mihi consuetudo sed dulcis. Agitatiorem mihi animumesse credebam nec tibi hodie adfirmaverim an fuerit. Quaeris quomodo desierim? In primum Tiberii Caesaris principatum iuventae tempus inciderat: alienigenatum sacra movebantur et inter argumenta superstitionis ponebatur quorundamanimalium abstinentia. Patre itaque meo rogante, qui non calumniam timebatsed philosophiam oderat, ad pristinam consuetudinem redii; nec difficultermihi ut inciperem melius cenare persuasit. [23] Laudare solebat Attalusculcitam quae resisteret corpori: tali utor etiam senex, in qua vestigiumapparere non possit. Haec rettuli ut probarem tibi quam vehementes haberent tirunculi impetusprimos ad optima quaeque, si quis exhortaretur illos, si quis inpelleret. Sed aliquid praecipientium vitio peccatur, qui nos docent disputare, nonvivere, aliquid discentium, qui propositum adferunt ad praeceptores suosnon animum excolendi sed ingenium. Itaque quae philosophia fuit facta philologiaest. [24] Multum autem ad rem pertinet quo proposito ad quamquam rem accedas. Qui grammaticus futurus Vergilium scrutatur non hoc animo legit illud egregium 'vigilandum est; nisi properamus relinquemur; agit nos agiturque veloxdies; inscii rapimur; omnia in futurum disponimus et inter praecipitialenti sumus': sed ut observet, quotiens Vergilius de celeritate temporumdicit, hoc uti verbo illum 'fugit'. [25] Ille qui ad philosophiam spectat haec eadem quo debet adducit. 'NumquamVergilius' inquit 'dies dicit ire, sed fugere, quod currendi genus concitatissimumest, et optimos quosque primos rapi: quid ergo cessamus nos ipsi concitare, ut velocitatem rapidissimae rei possimus aequare? Meliora praetervolant, deteriora succedunt. ' [26] Quemadmodum ex amphora primum quod est sincerissimumeffluit, gravissimum quodque turbidumque subsidit, sic in aetate nostraquod est optimum in primo est. Id exhauriri [in] aliis potius patimur, ut nobis faecem reservemus? Inhaereat istud animo et tamquam missum oraculoplaceat: [27] Quare optima? quia quod restat incertum est. Quare optima? quia iuvenespossumus discere, possumus facilem animum et adhuc tractabilem ad melioraconvertere; quia hoc tempus idoneum est laboribus, idoneum agitandis perstudia ingeniis [est] et exercendis per opera corporibus: quod superestsegnius et languidius est et propius a fine. Itaque toto hoc agamus animoet omissis ad quae devertimur in rem unam laboremus, ne hanc temporis pernicissimiceleritatem, quam retinere non possumus, relicti demum intellegamus. Primusquisque tamquam optimus dies placeat et redigatur in nostrum. [28] Quodfugit occupandum est. Haec non cogitat ille qui grammatici oculis carmenistud legit, ideo optimum quemque primum esse diem quia subeunt morbi, quia senectus premit et adhuc adulescentiam cogitantibus supra caput est, sed ait Vergilium semper una ponere morbos et senectutem -- non meherculesinmerito; senectus enim insanabilis morbus est. [29] 'Praeterea' inquit'hoc senectuti cognomen inposuit, "tristem" illam vocat: Non est quod mireris ex eadem materia suis quemque studiis apta colligere:in eodem prato bos herbam quaerit, canis leporem, ciconia lacertam. [30] Cum Ciceronis librum de re publica prendit hinc philologus aliquis, hinc grammaticus, hinc philosophiae deditus, alius alio curam suam mittit. Philosophus admiratur contra iustitiam dici tam multa potuisse. Cum adhanc eandem lectionem philologus accessit, hoc subnotat: duos Romanos regesesse quorum alter patrem non habet, alter matrem. Nam de Servi matre dubitatur;Anci pater nullus, Numae nepos dicitur. [31] Praeterea notat eum quem nosdictatorem dicimus et in historiis ita nominari legimus apud antiquos magistrumpopuli' vocatum. Hodieque id extat in auguralibus libris, et testimoniumest quod qui ab illo nominatur 'magister equitum' est. Aeque notat Romulumperisse solis defectione; provocationem ad populum etiam a regibus fuisse;id ita in pontificalibus libris +et aliqui qui+ putant et Fenestella. [32]Eosdem libros cum grammaticus explicuit, primum [verba expresse] 'reapse'dici a Cicerone, id est 're ipsa', in commentarium refert, nec minus 'sepse', id est 'se ipse'. Deinde transit ad ea quae consuetudo saeculi mutavit, tamquam ait Cicero 'quoniam sumus ab ipsa calce eius interpellatione revocati. 'Hanc quam nunc in circo 'cretam' vocamus 'calcem' antiqui dicebant. [33]Deinde Ennianos colligit versus et in primis illos de Africano scriptos: Ex eo se ait intellegere <opem> apud antiquos non tantum auxilium significassesed operam. Ait [opera] enim Ennius neminem potuisse Scipioni neque civemneque hostem reddere operae pretium. [34] Felicem deinde se putat quodinvenerit unde visum sit Vergilio dicere Ennium hoc ait Homero [se] subripuisse, Ennio Vergilium; esse enim apudCiceronem in his ipsis de re publica hoc epigramma Enni: [35] Sed ne et ipse, dum aliud ago, in philologum aut grammaticum delabar, illud admoneo, auditionem philosophorum lectionemque ad propositum beataevitae trahendam, non ut verba prisca aut ficta captemus et translationesinprobas figurasque dicendi, sed ut profutura praecepta et magnificas voceset animosas quae mox in rem transferantur. Sic ista ediscamus ut quae fuerintverba sint opera. [36] Nullos autem peius mereri de omnibus mortalibusiudico quam qui philosophiam velut aliquod artificium venale didicerunt, qui aliter vivunt quam vivendum esse praecipiunt. Exempla enim se ipsosinutilis disciplinae circumferunt, nulli non vitio quod insequuntur obnoxii. [37] Non magis mihi potest quisquam talis prodesse praeceptor quam gubernatorin tempestate nauseabundus. Tenendum rapiente fluctu gubernaculum, luctandumcum ipso mari, eripienda sunt vento vela: quid me potest adiuvare rectornavigii attonitus et vomitans? Quanto maiore putas vitam tempestate iactariquam ullam ratem? Non est loquendum sed gubernandum. [38] Omnia quae dicunt, quae turba audiente iactant, aliena sunt: dixit illa Platon, dixit Zenon, dixit Chrysippus et Posidonius et ingens agmen nominum tot ac talium. Quomodoprobare possint sua esse monstrabo: faciant quae dixerint. [39] Quoniam quae volueram ad te perferre iam dixi, nunc desideriotuo satis faciam et in alteram epistulam integrum quod exegeras transferam, ne ad rem spinosam et auribus erectis curiosisque audiendam lassus accedas. Vale.