Letter 848: The priesthood is a sacred trust, not a career.
Isidore of Pelusium→Neillmmon Scholastikos|c. 418 AD|Isidore of Pelusium|To Neillmmon Scholastikos (recipient)|AI-assisted
property economics
To Neilammon the Advocate [scholastikos, a trained lawyer].
Even though, in your cleverness at being formidable, you anticipated the defense and tore it to pieces in what you wrote, tell me again: does the surpassing wickedness of Martinianus and Zosimus, of Maron and Eustathius, not do harm to the doctrine, men whose life is now played out as if on a stage, fastening ill repute and mockery upon the most holy religion? But for my part I would not depart from the truth; rather I would use it itself for my defense. For since, having nothing for which you might also blame the most divine religion, you turned your accusation against certain of those who have been ordained, your knavery has become easily detected by all who are not without intelligence, by those who praise the divine way of life as surpassing, but who turn the accusation back against those men. And if you too would stand off from your love of contention, you would prove what has been said. For what absurdity do we utter when we say that the matter itself must be put to the test? And if it be found to be good, it is to be embraced, even though some of those who seem to pursue it have fallen into the very bottom of wickedness; but if it be shameful, it is to be fled, even though some of those who seem to incline toward it should appear to have driven themselves up to the very summit of virtue. For virtue must be embraced, even if all those who do not have right judgment of affairs find fault with it; and vice must be fled, even if all the lovers of evil things proclaim it aloud. For it is not from the sick, but from the healthy, that we must take our votes concerning affairs. For if we follow the sick, we shall also condemn philosophy.
To Neilammon the Advocate [scholastikos, a trained lawyer].
Even though, in your cleverness at being formidable, you anticipated the defense and tore it to pieces in what you wrote, tell me again: does the surpassing wickedness of Martinianus and Zosimus, of Maron and Eustathius, not do harm to the doctrine, men whose life is now played out as if on a stage, fastening ill repute and mockery upon the most holy religion? But for my part I would not depart from the truth; rather I would use it itself for my defense. For since, having nothing for which you might also blame the most divine religion, you turned your accusation against certain of those who have been ordained, your knavery has become easily detected by all who are not without intelligence, by those who praise the divine way of life as surpassing, but who turn the accusation back against those men. And if you too would stand off from your love of contention, you would prove what has been said. For what absurdity do we utter when we say that the matter itself must be put to the test? And if it be found to be good, it is to be embraced, even though some of those who seem to pursue it have fallen into the very bottom of wickedness; but if it be shameful, it is to be fled, even though some of those who seem to incline toward it should appear to have driven themselves up to the very summit of virtue. For virtue must be embraced, even if all those who do not have right judgment of affairs find fault with it; and vice must be fled, even if all the lovers of evil things proclaim it aloud. For it is not from the sick, but from the healthy, that we must take our votes concerning affairs. For if we follow the sick, we shall also condemn philosophy.
AI-assisted translation - This translation was produced with AI assistance and has not been peer-reviewed. See the 19th-century translation or original Latin/Greek below for scholarly use.