Letter 15.1

If you are well, I am glad. I and the army are well. Although I was being told with certainty that the Parthians had crossed the Euphrates with almost all their forces, I thought that more definite information about these matters would be sent to you by Marcus Bibulus, the proconsul. For that reason I did not think I had to report, in a public dispatch, rumors that concerned another man's province. Now, however, I have received information from the most reliable authorities: envoys, messengers, and dispatches. Whether I considered the seriousness of the matter itself, or the fact that I had not yet heard of Bibulus's arrival in Syria, or the fact that the conduct of this war concerns me almost as much as it concerns him, I decided that I ought to write to you about what had reached me. The envoys of King Antiochus of Commagene were the first to tell me that large bodies of Parthians had begun crossing the Euphrates. Since some people thought that full credit could not be given to that king, I decided to wait for more trustworthy information. On September 18, while I was leading the army into Cilicia on the border between Lycaonia and Cappadocia, I received a dispatch from Tarcondimotus, who is regarded as the most faithful ally and most devoted friend of the Roman people beyond Mount Taurus. He reported that Pacorus, son of Orodes, king of the Parthians, had crossed the Euphrates with a very large body of Parthian cavalry and had pitched camp at Tyba. This had caused very serious alarm in the province of Syria. On the same day I received a dispatch on the same subject from Iamblichus, phylarch of the Arabs, who is generally regarded as friendly and well disposed to our republic. I knew that, once this news arrived, our allies were unsettled and wavering in expectation of political change. Still, I hoped that those whom I had already visited, and who had seen the mildness and integrity of my administration, had become more devoted to the Roman people, and that Cilicia too would become more firmly loyal once it had felt the benefit of my fair rule. For that reason, and also to suppress those Cilicians who are under arms, and to show the enemy in Syria that the army of the Roman people was not retreating after receiving this news but actually drawing nearer, I decided to lead it right up to Mount Taurus. If my judgment carries any weight with you, especially in matters that you know only by report but that are almost passing before my eyes, I strongly urge and advise you to take measures for the defense of these provinces. It is already very late, but better late than never. You know how small and poorly equipped a force you sent me with, considering the gravity of the war expected. I did not fail to decline this command out of vanity, but because of a modest reluctance to refuse. I have never thought any danger so frightening that I would rather avoid it than obey your will. But the situation now is such that unless you quickly send into these provinces an army on the scale you usually employ in a war of the first importance, there is the greatest danger that we may have to abandon all the provinces on which the revenues of the Roman people depend. You should not put hope in a provincial levy: the men are not numerous, and those who exist scatter in every direction at the first alarm. Marcus Bibulus, a brave officer, has shown what he thinks that kind of soldier is worth; although you allowed him to levy troops in Asia, he declined to do so. Auxiliaries raised among the allies, because of the harshness and injustice of our rule, are either too weak to help much or so alienated from us that it seems improper to expect or trust anything from them. I count on the loyalty and forces, whatever their size, of King Deiotarus. Cappadocia has nothing to provide. The other kings and dynasts cannot be relied on either for resources or loyalty. For my part, despite this shortage of soldiers, I will certainly show no lack of courage, and I hope no lack of prudence. What will happen is uncertain. I pray that I may be able to secure my safety; I will certainly secure my honor.

CCXX (Fam. XV, 1) TO THE MAGISTRATES AND SENATE CILICIA, 22 SEPTEMBER: M. Tullius Cicero , son of Marcus, proconsul, greets the consuls, praetors, tribunes, and senate. If you are well, I am glad. I and the army are well. Although I had undoubted assurance that the Parthians had crossed the Euphrates with nearly all their forces, yet, believing that more definite information could be sent you on these points by the proconsul M. Bibulus , I concluded that it was not incumbent on me to mention in a public despatch reports reaching me concerning the province of another. Having since then, however, received information on the most unquestionable authority-from legates, messengers, and despatches — whether I considered the importance of the matter itself, or the fact of not having yet heard of Bibulus 's arrival in Syria , or that the conduct of this war was almost as much my business as that of Bibulus , I came to the conclusion that it was my duty to write you word of what had reached my ears. The legates of king Antiochus of Commagene were the first to inform me that large bodies of Parthians had begun to cross the Euphrates . On the receipt of this report, as there were certain persons who thought that full credit could not be given to that sovereign, I made up my mind that I must wait for more trustworthy information. On the 18th of September, whilst marching into Cilicia at the head of my army, on the frontier between Lycaonia and Cappadocia , a despatch was handed to me from Tarcondimotus , who is considered to be the most faithful ally and the most devoted friend of the Roman people beyond Mount Taurus , announcing that Pacorus , son of Orodes , the king of the Parthians , had crossed the Euphrates with a very large body of Parthian cavalry, and had pitched his camp at Tyba, and that consequently a very serious commotion had been caused in the province of Syria . On the same day a despatch on the same subject reached me from Iamblichus , phylarch of the Arabians , who is generally considered to be well-disposed and friendly to our Republic. Though I was fully aware that, on receipt of this information, our allies were unsettled in their feelings and wavering from the expectation of political change, I yet hoped that those whom I had already visited, and who had seen the mildness and purity of my administration, had been made more devoted to the Roman people, and that Cilicia , too, would become more certainly loyal when it had once felt the advantage of my equitable rule. Acting at once from this motive, and also with a view to put down those of the Cilicians who are in arms, and to show the enemy in Syria that the army of the Roman people, so far from retiring on receipt of that news, was actually approaching nearer, I determined to lead it right up to Mount Taurus . But if my authority has any weight with you — especially in matters which you only know by report, but which are all but passing under my eyes — I strongly urge and advise you to take measures for the defence of these provinces: it is over-late already, but better late than never. For myself, you are well aware how slenderly supplied and how imperfectly furnished with troops, in view of the expected gravity of this war, you have despatched me. And it was not from the blindness of vanity, but from a modest scruple as to refusing, that I did not decline this business. For I have never considered any danger so formidable, as to make me wish to avoid it in preference to obeying your will. But at this moment the matter is of such a nature, that unless you promptly despatch into these provinces an army on the same scale as you are wont to employ for the most important war, there is the most imminent danger of our having to give up all those provinces, on which the revenues of the Roman people depend. Again, there is this reason for your not resting any hopes on a levy in the province — that men are not numerous, and that such as there are fly in every direction at the first alarm. Again, what this class of soldier is worth in his opinion has been shown by that gallant officer, M. Bibulus : for, though you had granted him leave to hold a levy in Asia , he has declined to do so. For auxiliaries raised from the allies, owing to the harshness and injustice of our rule, are either so weak that they can do us little service, or so disaffected to us that it seems improper to expect anything from them or trust anything to them. Both the loyalty and the forces, whatever their amount, of king Deiotarus I reckon as being at our service. Cappadocia has nothing to give. Other kings and despots are not to be relied upon either in regard to their resources or their loyalty. For myself, in spite of this short supply of soldiers, I shall certainly show no lack of courage, nor, I hope, of prudence either. What will happen is uncertain. I pray that I may be able to secure my safety! I will certainly secure my honour.

I. Scr. in Cilicia exeunte mense Septembri (circa X. K. Oct.) a.u.c. 703. M. TULLIUS M. F. CICERO PROCOS. S. D. COS. PR. TR. PL. SENATUI. S. v. v. b. e. e. q. v. Etsi non dubie mihi nuntiabatur Parthos transisse Euphratem cum omnibus fere suis copiis, tamen, quod arbitrabar a M. Bibulo procos. certiora de iis rebus ad vos scribi posse, statuebam mihi non necesse esse publice scribere ea, quae de alterius provincia nuntiarentur; postea vero quam certissimis auctoribus, legatis nuntiis litteris, sum certior factus, vel quod tanta res erat vel quod nondum audieramus Bibulum in Syriam venisse vel quia administratio huius belli mihi cum Bibulo paene est communis, quae ad me delata essent, scribenda ad vos putavi. Regis Antiochi Commageni legati primi mihi nuntiarunt Parthorum magnas copias Euphratem transire coepisse; quo nuntio allato, cum essent nonnulli, qui ei regi minorem fidem habendam putarent, statui exspectandum esse, si quid certius afferretur. A. d. XIII Kal. Oct., cum exercitum in Ciliciam ducerem, in finibus Lycaoniae et Cappadociae mihi litterae redditae sunt a Tarcondimoto, qui fidelissimus socius trans Taurum amicissimusque populi Romani existimatur, Pacorum Orodi regis Parthorum filium cum permagno equitatu Parthico transisse Euphratem et castra posuisse Tybae magnumque tumultum esse in provincia Syria excitatum; eodem die ab Iamblicho, phylarcho Arabum, quem homines opinantur bene sentire amicumque esse rei publicae nostrae, litterae de iisdem rebus mihi redditae sunt. His rebus allatis, etsi intelligebam socios infirme animatos esse et novarum rerum exspectatione suspensos, sperabam tamen eos, ad quos iam accesseram quique nostram mansuetudinem integritatemque perspexerant, amiciores populo Romano esse factos, Ciliciam autem firmiorem fore, si aequitatis nostrae particeps facta esset: et ob eam causam et ut opprimerentur ii, qui ex Cilicum gente in armis essent, et ut hostis is, qui esset in Syria, sciret exercitum populi Romani non modo non re cedere iis nuntiis allatis, sed etiam propius accedere, exercitum ad Taurum institui ducere. Sed, si quid apud vos auctoritas mea ponderis habet, in iis praesertim rebus, quas vos audistis, ego paene cerno, magno opere vos et hortor et moneo, ut his provinciis serius vos quidem, quam decuit, sed aliquando tamen consulatis. Nos quemadmodum instructos et quibus praesidiis munitos ad tanti belli opinionem miseritis, non estis ignari: quod ego negotium non stultitia occaecatus, sed verecundia deterritus non recusavi; neque enim umquam ullum periculum tantum putavi, quod subterfugere mallem quam vestrae auctoritati obtemperare. Hoc autem tempore res sese sic habet, ut, nisi exercitum tantum, quantum ad maximum bellum mittere soletis, mature in has provincias miseritis, summum periculum sit, ne amittendae sint omnes eae provinciae, quibus vectigalia populi Romani continentur. Quamobrem autem in hoc provinciali delectu spem habeatis aliquam, causa nulla est: neque multi sunt et diffugiunt, qui sunt, metu oblato et, quod genus hoc militum sit, iudicavit vir fortissimus M. Bibulus in Asia, qui, cum vos ei permisissetis, delectum habere noluerit. Nam sociorum auxilia propter acerbitatem atque iniurias imperii nostri aut ita imbecilla sunt, ut non multum nos iuvare possint, aut ita alienata a nobis, ut neque exspectandum ab iis neque committendum iis quidquam esse videatur. Regis Deiotari et voluntatem et copias, quantaecumque sunt, nostras esse duco; Cappadocia est inanis; reliqui reges tyrannique neque opibus satis firmi nec voluntate sunt. Mihi in hac paucitate militum animus certe non deerit, spero ne consilium quidem. Quid casurum sit, incertum est: utinam saluti nostrae consulere possimus! dignitati certe consulemus.